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493 F.2d 1248

Docket No. 73-2060.

Reid v. Rose

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Argued Feb. 15, 1974.

Decided March 13, 1974.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1974-03-13

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently January 1975

3 federal appellate ·

2 counsel of record

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” 411 U.S. at 267 , 93 S.Ct. at 1608 .”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Stout v. United States

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Tollett v. Henderson

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1974-03-13

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1David S. Kennedy (Court Appointed), Memphis, Tenn., on brief for petitioner.

¶2R. Jackson Rose, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., on brief for respondent; David M. Pack, Atty. Gen. of Tenn., of counsel.

¶3Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, EDWARDS and LIVELY, Circuit Judges.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Appellant in this case was charged with and pled guilty to assault with intent to murder and robbery with a deadly weapon when he was 16 years old. He was sentenced to two concurrent sentences of 20 years and 10 years, respectively. He now appeals from denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). He contends that his constitutional rights to due process were violated by the facts that at a juvenile court waiver hearing, no testimony was taken prior to the entry of the waiver, and that he was denied counsel at a critical stage in the criminal proceeding because he had no lawyer and was offered none at the juvenile court waiver proceeding.

¶6We would consider that these issues posed substantial problems for critical consideration and probable reversal, absent a 1973 decision of the United States Supreme Court reversing this court in the case of Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U. S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). In Tollett a majority of the court held:

“When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, supra, at 267, 93 S.Ct. at 1608.

¶7We affirm the District Court’s denial of the writ because, and only because, we believe our decision is controlled by Tollett v. Henderson, supra.

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