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493 So. 2d 504

493 So.2d 504

11 Fla.L.Weekly 1830

Docket No. 85-1694.

State v. Russo

STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Joseph RUSSO, Leland Curry, James Thomas Curry, Marvin Carlsen and Roland Caricofe, Appellees.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided August 20, 1986.

Rehearing Denied October 1, 1986.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1986-08-20

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Before you can find the defendant guilty of conducting or participating in an enterprise, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. The defendant was employed by or associated with an enterprise. 2. The defendant conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in such enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity by engaging in at least two of the following incidents of Grand Theft as charged in Counts I, II, III, and IV of the Information. 3. Of those incidents in which the defendant was engaged, at least two of them had the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, methods of commission, or were interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and were not isolated incidents. In order to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, the incidents must amount to or otherwise constitute a threat of continuing racketeering activity. "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, union chartered under the laws of Florida, or other legal entity, or any unchartered union, association, or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes lawful as well as unlawful enterprises and governmental as well as other entities.”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Shimek v. State, Watts v. State

“interpretation is in line with the Florida Supreme Court's determination that the proper target of RICO prosecution will be the career criminal.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Watts v. State

Relies on Bowden v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1986-08-20

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently September 2018

8 state decisions

401986199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*505 Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert L. Teitler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.

¶2Robert A. Leventhal, Orlando, for appellee Joseph Russo.

¶3Jeffrey H. Garland, Port St. Lucie, for appellee Caricofe.

¶4Lee E. Muschott, Fort Pierce, for appellee James Thomas Curry.

¶5Harrison T. Slaughter, Jr., Orlando, for appellee Leland Curry.

¶6Richard S. Rhodes, Orlando, for appellee Marvin Otto Carlsen.

¶7PER CURIAM.

¶8This is an appeal from an order dismissing Count I of the indictment of five defendants which charged them with violating the Florida Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), Section 895.03(3), Florida Statutes (1983). The indictment charged the defendants with the substantive offense of trafficking in cannabis and conspiracy to so traffic. The trial court ruled that the indictment was legally insufficient because it charged the defendants with the commission of only one offense whereas section 895.02(4) requires "two incidents" of racketeering conduct. That section provides:

"Pattern of racketeering activity" means engaging in at least two incidents of racketeering conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims, or methods of commission or that otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated incidents, provided at least one of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act and that the last of such incidents occurred within 5 years after a prior incident of racketeering conduct.

¶9The main issue on appeal is whether the indictment, which charged the defendants with the act of trafficking in cannabis and the conspiracy to so traffic, satisfied the requirement that there be "two incidents" or predicate acts of racketeering conduct.

¶10The state argues that the trial court erred in determining that the offenses constituted only one incident and asserts that acts which are part of the same transaction can still qualify as distinct incidents if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not. The state refers to federal case law which allows for prosecution under federal RICO if the state charges the defendant with any of the substantive offenses included within the definition of racketeering and also charges the defendant with conspiracy to commit that offense.

¶11While the Florida RICO statute is similar to the federal RICO statute it contains one important difference. Florida RICO refers to "two incidents" of racketeering conduct whereas federal RICO requires "two predicate acts." We believe that the legislature intended to narrow the application of the Florida RICO statute by this language. This interpretation is in line with the Florida Supreme Court's determination that the proper target of RICO prosecutions will be the career criminal. See Bowden v. State,402 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 1981). Thus, we affirm the dismissal of the defective indictment.

¶12DOWNEY, ANSTEAD and DELL, JJ., concur.

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