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← 493 SW2D 190 - Butler v. State

Butler v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1973

Citation profile

52
cited by 52 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
March 2003
most recently cited

1 district · 50 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 52 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2003 · most notably Baxter v. Palmigiano (1976), Heitman v. State (1991)

1 district · 50 state decisions

2501973198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Harris v. New York · Lego v. Twomey · Walker v. State · Morales v. State

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 52 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““We deem these authorities sufficient to support the rule that, if the party is under arrest, silence cannot be used to support the hypothesis of consent to statements made in his presence by others. From the bill of exceptions, we infer that the learned judge who tried this case admitted this evidence because appellant had been cautioned. Our Code of Criminal Procedure (article 750) provides that ‘the confession shall not be used if at the time it was made the defendant ... is in custody of an officer, unless such confession ... be made voluntarily after having first been cautioned that it may be used against him,’ etc. As above stated, the learned trial judge admitted in evidence the silence of appellant upon the ground that the appellant had been cautioned. We are of the opinion that appellant had been cautioned was an ADDITIONAL reason, to being under arrest, for excluding his silence. * * * * We are of the opinion that, whether cautioned or not, his silence should not have been received in evidence against him.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““(1) where it be shown to be the voluntary statement of the accused taken in an examining court (Sec. 1(a)); (2) where the accused makes an oral statement of facts or circumstances that are found to be true, which conduce to establish his guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property, or the instrument with which he states the offense was committed (Sec. 1(e)); or (3) where the oral statement was ‘res gestae of the arrest or of the offense’ (Sec. 1(f)).” Id. at 193 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““Even if Harris is correct in holding that the mere absence of Miranda warnings and waiver does not affect the reliability of ‘trustworthiness’ of a confession, it does not follow that proof of oral confessions in Texas state criminal proceedings not taken in compliance with the confession statute can be considered equally as ‘trustworthy.’ Indeed, this court cannot so hold in face of the statutory policy to the contrary. As earlier noted, the Legislature in Article 38.22, supra, has made the statutory determination that testimony surrounding oral confessions made while in custody or confinement is unreliable with certain statutory exceptions. As earlier noted, it has been said that this perceived evil arises because oral confessions are “‘... so liable to be misunderstood, so easily fabricated and so hard to be contradicted.” ’ Pierson v. State, supra, 168 S.W.2d 256 at 259 . “This statutory exclusion is not a constitutional requirement, either state or federal, and the wisdom of this legislative policy is, of course, not a matter for this court. To permit testimony as to an oral confession (not within any statutory exception) for impeachment would undermine the legislative determination expressed in Article 38.22, supra. ‘Harris, of course, in no way obligates these (state) courts to Overturn prior decisions as a matter of state criminal procedure.’ Note, 49 Tex.L.Rev. 1119, 1125 (1971). The exclusion of oral confessions stands on a different footing than the Miranda error ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.