Russell v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Re: Movant’s claim that he was not afforded his rights under Chapter 211, RSMo (Juvenile Code). It is movant’s contention that because he was committed to the training school for boys by the Juvenile Court of the City of St. Louis and was an inmate thereof on July 12, 1959, the date of the offense, that he was still subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court and was entitled to the procedures provided for in the Juvenile Code. Movant was born January 18, 1942, and attained the age of seventeen on January 18, 1959. He was about 17% years old at the time of the offense on July 12, 1959. The circuit court held that movant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court nor entitled to the procedures of the Juvenile Code because, at the time of the alleged offense, he was not a child as that term is defined in § 211.021, whereby ‘child’ is defined as being a person under seventeen years of age. The court also held that movant was not under the continuing jurisdiction of the St. Louis Juvenile Court because of that portion of § 211.041, which provides, ‘except in cases where he is committed to and received by the state board of training schools, unless jurisdiction has been returned to the committing court by provisions of seeJ tion 219.220, RSMo, through requests of the court to the board of training schools.’ Movant had not been returned to the Juvenile Court of the City of St. Louis. “Movant argues that Chapter 219, RSMo, ‘State Training Schools’, co”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Interest of A.J.C. · Russell v. Wyrick

2. ““A. The Missouri Supreme Court erred in denying the appellant’s allegation that he was a juvenile ward of the State of Missouri at the time of the alleged crime and that he should have been treated as such. A denial of the above was a violation of his constitutional rights (14th Amendment) . “B. The Missouri Supreme Court erred in denying the appellant’s allegation that the trial court who received his plea of guilty violated his United States Constitutional Rights under the 14th Amendment when appellant entered his plea of guilty in that it was not made voluntarily and with an understanding of the nature of the charge. “C. The Missouri Supreme Court erred in ruling that appellant’s Constitutional Rights under the 14th Amendment were not violated when the trial judge did not have appellant sua sponte mentally examined before accepting a plea of guilty on a capital offense, even though the circumstances indicated such was needed. “D. The Missouri Supreme Court erred in ruling that appellant’s Constitutional Rights (under the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments) were not violated as: 1. Court appointed counsel failed to request a mental examination of Appellant either before or at the time of appellant’s plea. 2. Court appointed counsel had such a conflict of interest that appellant was deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed right of counsel. “E. The Missouri Supreme Court erred in ruling that appellant’s Constitutional Rights were not violated by the trial court at his 27.26 ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Russell v. Wyrick