495 So. 2d 128 - Puiatti v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 federal appellate · 8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “On the charge of murder in the first degree, it is the sentence of this Court that you each be put to death according to the law. And in reaching that sentencing judgment, I find three aggravating circumstances. First is that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, or effect escape from custody. And secondly, that it was committed for p[ec]uniary gain. And third, that this capital felony was a homicide and committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner, without any pretext of moral or legal justification. I find a mitigating factor for Mr. Glock, that he had no significant history of prior criminal activities. I find no mitigating factors for Mr. Puiatti.[ 7 ] And in weighing this mitigating factor that I find for Mr. Glock, and the aggravating factors that I find, I’m convinced that the sentence of death is mandated by Florida law.”

   6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Puiatti v. McNeil · Glock v. Dugger

2. “We find that Bruton [ v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968)] is not applicable under the facts of this cause, concluding that Parker v. Randolph controls this case. In Parker , the United States Supreme Court held that Bruton does not require reversal of a defendant's conviction when the defendant himself has confessed and his confession "`interlocks' with and supports the confession of his codefendant." Confessions interlock when the salient facts against the first defendant that appear in the confession of the second defendant also appear in the confession of the first, and vice versa. ..... In this case, Puiatti and Glock offered interlocking confessions. The initial individual confessions contained only slight inconsistencies, and each set forth sufficient evidence on the charged crimes to sustain the confessor's conviction. The fact that Glock's initial confession might have been exculpatory toward Puiatti concerning some details does not render its admission harmful when Puiatti's own confession clearly shows him guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Further, the subsequent joint confession, admitted without objection by Puiatti, reconciled the minor discrepancies of the individual confessions by Puiatti and Glock. We conclude that the trial court correctly denied Puiatti's motion for severance during the guilt phase of the trial. We emphasize that the inconsistencies between Puiatti's and Glock's initial confessions do not affect their g”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Puiatti v. McNeil · 521 So. 2d 1106 - Puiatti v. State

3. “We hold that a severance was not required in the penalty phase of the trial. As to the alleged conflict concerning which defendant dominated the other, our decision in McCray disposes of this contention. In McCray we stated: [T]he fact that the defendant might have a better chance of acquittal or a strategic advantage if tried separately does not establish the right to a severance. Nor is hostility among defendants, or an attempt by one defendant to escape punishment by throwing the blame on a codefendant, a sufficient reason, by itself, to require severance. If the defendants engage in a swearing match as to who did what, the jury should resolve the conflicts and determine the truth of the matter.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Puiatti v. McNeil · Puiatti v. McNeil