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← 496 F.2d 1012 - United States v. Mosley

United States v. Mosley’s Empirical Analysis

496 F.2d 1012 · 1974

Citation profile

71
cited by 71 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
7
states following
April 2015
most recently cited

54 federal appellate · 1 district · 13 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 71 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2015 · most notably Hampton v. United States (1976), United States v. Alvarez (1985)

54 federal appellate · 1 district · 13 state decisions

48019741980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 841 (§ 401 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on United States v. Russell · Sherman v. United States · Corning Glass Works v. Brennan · Williamson v. United States · Blake v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 71 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to commit it.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[W]hen a defendant testified that he obtained the contraband from a government undercover agent, the Government must produce the undercover agent ... to take the case to the jury.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““It will be seen also that under the questionable instruction, the jury was not permitted to acquit the accused unless it ‘should find from the evidence’ that there existed the necessary elements of the defense. (Emphasis added) This was improper, since in requiring that the jury ‘should find’ certain facts, the existence of which were made indispensable to acquittal, a definite, conclusive, determination of disputed factual issues was required of the jury as a condition to acquittal. Such a requirement was erroneously imposed. The appellant was indeed entitled to acquittal if the jury ‘should find’ that he ‘had no previous intent or purpose to commit’ the . offense ‘and did so only because he was induced or persuaded by some agent of the Government’. But he was also entitled to be acquitted if, from the evidence, the jury, because of the entertainment of reasonable doubt, should be unable to ‘find’ that the necessary elements of the defense had not been excluded. In reaching our conclusion, we have been mindful of obligation to consider the instructions in their entirety. The jury was properly informed, in a general instruction, as to the burden of proof which rested upon the prosecution; however, we cannot assume that it carried the advice of the general instruction into application to the instruction emphasizing the specific elements of the defense. The possibility that there was confusion or misunderstanding is strengthened, not eliminated, by view of the instructions as ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.