In re Seagate Technology, LLC’s Empirical Analysis
497 F.3d 1360 · 2007
Citation profile
81 federal appellate · 70 district · 6 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 343 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 2024 · most notably Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. (2016), i4i Ltd. Partnership v. Microsoft Corp. (2010)
81 federal appellate · 70 district · 6 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (§ 35 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 15 U.S.C. § 1681 · 17 U.S.C. § 504 (§ 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976) · 35 U.S.C. § 283 · 35 U.S.C. § 284 · 35 U.S.C. § 285
Relies on Farmer v. Brennan · Hickman v. Taylor · Singleton v. Wulff · Upjohn Company v. United States · Brunswick Corporation v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 343 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid patent. The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry. If this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.”
41 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[A] willfulness claim asserted in the original complaint must necessarily be grounded exclusively in the accused in-fringer’s pre-filing conduct. By contrast, when an accused infringer’s post-filing conduct is reckless, a patentee can move for a preliminary injunction, which generally provides an adequate remedy for combating post-filing' willful infringement. A patentee who does not attempt to" stop an accused infringer’s activities in this manner should not be allowed to accrue enhanced damages based 'solely on the infringer’s post-filing cpnduct.”
8 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent““The widely applied standard for determining the scope of a waiver ... is that the waiver applies to all other communications relating to the same subject matter.” Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed.Cir.2005). This broad scope is grounded in principles of fairness and selves to prevent a party from simultaneously using the privilege as both a sword and a shield; that is, it prevents the inequitable result of a party disclosing favorable communications while asserting the privilege as to less favorable ones. EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1301 ; Fort James, 412 F.3d at 1349 . Ultimately, however, “[tjhere is no bright line test for determining what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice sought and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting further disclosures.” Fort James, 412 F.3d at 1349-50 .”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.