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← 497 F.3d 178 - Murden v. Artuz

Murden v. Artuz’s Empirical Analysis

497 F.3d 178 · 2007

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
September 2022
most recently cited

1 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently September 2022 · most notably Clark v. Perez (2008), Jasmine Young v. Philadelphia Police Department (2016)

1 federal appellate ·

200200720102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Coleman v. Thompson · Schlup v. Delo · Massaro v. United States · Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when: 1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that: (a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “court must deny a motion to vacate a judgment when ... [although sufficient facts appear on the record of the proceedings underlying the judgment to have permitted, upon appeal from such judgment, adequate review of the ground or issue raised upon the motion, no such appellate review or determination occurred owing to the defendant’s ... unjustifiable failure to raise such ground or issue upon an appeal actually perfected by him.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[T]he court must consider how reasonable jurors, fairly examining all of the evidence presented, would assess the petitioner’s guilt or innocence. In evaluating the record as a whole, the habeas court may make its own credibility determinations as to both the new evidence and the evidence already in the record that may be thrown into doubt by the new material. With respect to the ultimate issue of innocence, however, Schlup does not permit the court to make an independent judgment of whether reasonable doubt exists, but instead requires a probabilistic determination about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do. This probabilistic analysis must determine not merely whether a reasonable doubt ex ists in the light of the new evidence, but rather whether it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.