Limone v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 9 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The state investigation of the Deegan case had stalled. Without Barboza there was no case. Without the FBI there was no Barboza. While the state authorities could corroborate information about the murder— how it happened, where and when — Barboza’s testimony was the only link to the plaintiffs. And his testimony about the plaintiffs could not be corroborated because it was false. Only the FBI had the means to prove Barboza’s falsity, and they were not talking. Even when Barboza testified that 'the FBI never promised [him] anything,' they stood mute. The FBI’s role at trial went far beyond the failure to share evidence in their files. They were a formidable presence through the trial both directly and indirectly. They cultivated, debriefed and prepared Barboza. They corrected his testimony only when it was inconsistent with reports the defense was likely to have or when it made him vulnerable on cross-examination. Condon even testified on Barboza's behalf attesting to the “purity” of Barboza’s false testimony. They conferred with and controlled major prosecution witnesses before they testified (Anthony Stathopoulos and John Fitzgerald). They advised Suffolk County Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) Jack Zalkind ("Zalkind”) and his staff behind the scenes.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Limone v. United States

2. “Someone in law enforcement had to have done so, either the FBI directly or state law enforcement in the FBI's presence.”). But the court’s opinion, fairly read, attributes primary responsibility for shoring up Barboza’s testimony to the FBI. See, e.g., id. at 179, 180 . 10 . The most recent draft restatement suggests that an intentional tortfeasor should be deemed the legal cause of any harm that he intends to inflict without reference to the foreseeability of that harm. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harms § 33 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). The SJC has not spoken to this proposal and, given the foreseeability of the harm flowing from the FBFs misconduct, we need not decide whether section 33 applies here. 11 . In Massachusetts, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress may succeed only if the defendant has intentionally inflicted severe emotional distress "without privilege.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Limone v. United States

3. “(1) that the [defendant] intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was beyond all possible bounds of decency and was utterly intolerable in a civilized community; (3) that the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiffs distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe and of a nature that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Limone v. United States