State v. Randen’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Recently, in Stuck v. Leapley, 473 N.W.2d 476, 478-79 (S.D.1991), we carefully outlined the various burdens of proof in habitual offender proceedings. [W]here the defendant places the constitutional validity of the prior convictions in issue by a motion to strike or other appropriate means, the state has an initial burden of proving the existence of prior valid convictions by a preponderance of the evidence.... [W]hen state meets its initial burden of proof, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the prior convictions are invalid. This appears to require a plea transcript indicating that the prior plea was not valid, or testimony to that effect by a participant in the plea proceeding (i.e., defendant, defendant’s attorney, the prosecutor, the judge, etc.), (emphasis in original) (footnote and citations omitted). In Stuck , we held that state met its initial burden of proving the constitutional validity of prior convictions challenged by a habeas corpus petitioner by submitting records of the convictions showing that, at the time the petitioner entered his guilty-pleas, he was fully advised of his constitutional rights and was represented by counsel. Because the petitioner failed to offer plea transcripts indicating that the prior pleas were not valid and failed to offer any other evidence or testimony to that effect, we held that he failed to meet his burden of showing some invalidity in the prior convictions and upheld his habitual offender conviction.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Moeller

2. “The defendant in Aspen was convicted of a criminal offense after a jury trial and then admitted his habitual offender status. Thus, State was not put to its proof of prior convictions at that point in time. The defendant later filed a habeas corpus action challenging, for the first time, the validity of one of the prior convictions that had been used to enhance his sentence. Rather than presenting any evidence of prior convictions to the habeas court, State waived a hearing and agreed to submit the case on briefs. Thus at that stage in the proceedings, the record was devoid of any evidence of prior convictions and the habe-as court should have granted the defendant’s petition for relief. (Footnote omitted.) Instead, the habeas court honored the State’s request to remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. During the resentencing proceeding, State submitted the record of the prior conviction challenged by the defendant in the habeas corpus action. The record established the validity of the conviction. The defendant appealed and, on appeal, we held that the resentencing procedure violated principles of double jeopardy.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Weiker v. Solem

3. “"[A] plea of guilty cannot stand unless the record in some manner indicates a free and intelligent waiver of the three constitutional rights mentioned in [ Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 , 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)]—self-incrimination, confrontation and jury trial—and an understanding of the nature and consequences of the plea." Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 128 , 178 N.W.2d 198, 201 (1970). Convictions based upon guilty pleas obtained in violation of Boykin cannot be used to enhance a sentence under the habitual offender statutes. State v. King, 383 N.W.2d 854 (S.D.1986); Application of Garritsen, 376 N.W.2d 575 (S.D. 1985).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Anderson