Ex Parte Beverly’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 37 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"In short, reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. . . . Rather, it is a determination that a defendant has been convicted through a judicial process which is defective in some fundamental respect, e.g., incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or prosecutorial misconduct. When this occurs, the accused has a strong interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 527 So. 2d 148 - Ex Parte State · 717 So. 2d 862 - Reed v. State

2. “"I agree that Defendant's conviction for first degree murder is due to be affirmed. The intentional killing element of the capital offense for which Defendant was indicted and tried was fully supported by the evidence; thus, the State's right to retry Defendant on the reindicted charge of first degree murder is not impugned. "I also agree that Defendant's conviction for grand larceny is due to be reversed and judgment thereon rendered. But I do not agree that this result obtains because the trial court, upon Defendant's second trial, failed to instruct the jury on grand larceny as a lesser-included offense of robbery. The Court's opinion creates the anomaly of forcing a defendant to make himself subject to retrial if he requests a lesser-included offense in those cases in which he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the higher offense. Furthermore, the opinion's reference to the State's burden to request the lesser-included offense charge is not realistic. Stated bluntly, I have never heard of it. I would reaffirm Coleman, rather than overrule it. Coleman v. State, 373 So.2d 1254 (Ala. Crim.App.1979)."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Ex Parte Roberts

3. ““The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. This is central to the objective of the prohibition against successive trials. The Clause does not allow ‘the State ... to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense/ since ‘[t]he constitutional prohibition against “double jeopardy” was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.’ Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 , 78 S.Ct. 221, 223 , 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957); see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-388 , 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1061-1062 , 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 , 91 S.Ct. 547, 554 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 622 So. 2d 1321 - Staten v. State