497 So. 2d 558 - Hammond v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘[EJven if Hammond was actually unarmed, we find his contention to be without merit. By virtue of the jury’s verdict, which encompasses its finding that Hammond was armed with a deadly weapon, the trial court had no alternative but to sentence Hammond in accordance with § 13A-5-6(a)(4). Holloway v. State, 477 So.2d 487 (Ala.Crim.App.1985). This holds true regardless of whether the jury based its verdict on complicity, embraced in § 13A-2-23(2). “It is well established that a person present, aiding and abetting another in the commission of [a crime], is guilty as a principal and punishable equally with the perpetrator of the crime.” Biggs v. State, 331 So.2d 763, 764 (Ala.Cr.App.) cert. denied, 331 So.2d 765 (Ala.Cr.App.1976) (emphasis added [in Hammond ]). “ ‘Furthermore, if we accepted Hammond’s contention, we would be giving the trial court discretion exceeding that conferred by statute. In Mitchell v. State, 450 So.2d 181 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), the court, in rejecting the argument that the trial court should be able to consider any mitigating circumstances, observed that the language of § 13A-5-6(a)(4) is clear and its meaning is plain. See also Rocker v. State, 443 So.2d 1316 (Ala.Cr.App.1983). In the instant case, we likewise reject the contention that the trial court should be able to consider as a mitigating circumstance Hammond’s degree of participation in the offense; the statute simply does not differentiate between principals and accessories. For an example of a stat”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Lucas v. State · Moore v. State

2. “"In conclusion, the Court recognized that the respondent 'is given the benefit of her acquittal on the counts on which she was acquitted, and it is neither irrational nor illogical to require her to accept the burden of conviction on the counts on which the jury convicted.' Id. at 69, 105 S.Ct. at 479. "We adopt this approach formulated in Dunn and the cases which followed it and we find that 'the best course to take is simply to insulate jury verdicts from review on this ground.' Id. at 69, 105 S.Ct. at 479 (footnote omitted). This conclusion follows the recent opinion in McClellan v. State , 484 So.2d 1150 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985). There, the court recognized the conflict of views on the treatment of the inconsistent verdicts rendered on several counts and chose to adopt the majority view, which follows the holding of Dunn . See also W. LaFave J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 23.7(e) (1984) (recognizing that most state courts follow the approach taken by the Supreme Court). "As Dunn 'stressed the unreviewable power of a jury to return a verdict of not guilty for impermissible reasons,' Harris v. Rivera , 454 U.S. at 346 , 102 S.Ct. at 464 , so have the Alabama appellate courts. See, e.g., Bradham v. State , 27 Ala. App. 225 , 170 So. 222 , cert. denied , 233 Ala. 106 , 170 So. 223 (1936) (wherein the court recognized that, although the same evidence amply supported a guilty verdict on both counts of the indictment, it was within the province of the jury to find the defendant guilt”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 520 So. 2d 229 - Smelcher v. State · 651 So. 2d 1128 - Hill v. State

3. “"In United States v. Powell , 469 U.S. 57 , 105 S.Ct. 471 , 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984), wherein the United States Supreme Court reasserts the well established principle that inconsistent verdicts are permissible in federal courts, the respondent argued that the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel should apply to verdicts rendered by a single jury, to nullify a guilty verdict rendered on a compound offense where the jury acquits the defendant of the predicate offense. Id. at 63 , 105 S.Ct. at 476 . The respondent was urging the Court to carve out an exception to the general rule enunciated in Dunn v. United States , 284 U.S. 390 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), that a defendant convicted by a jury on one count cannot attack that conviction on the ground that it is inconsistent with the jury's verdict of acquittal on another count. "In rejecting the respondent's argument for an exception to the Dunn rule, the *Page 1133 Court noted Dunn 's progeny and observed that 'this is not a case where a once-established principle has gradually been eroded by subsequent opinions of this Court.' 469 U.S. at 63 , 105 S.Ct. at 476 . In further proclaiming the soundness of the Dunn rule and disregarding the respondent's argument, the Powell Court stated: " 'As the Dunn Court noted, where truly inconsistent verdicts have been reached, "[t]he most that can be said . . . is that the verdict shows that either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury did not speak their real conclu”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 651 So. 2d 1128 - Hill v. State