497 So. 2d 875 - Koenig v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “It is apparent in the foregoing observation that the concern there expressed is the imagined bad faith effort by a trial judge to obtain a conviction-prone jury while avoiding putting the defendant in jeopardy. While we, of course, share that concern, there is absolutely no indication in the present case that the trial court, though in error, acted out of a desire to aid the prosecution or harm the defendant. Moreover, were there evidence that the proceedings were terminated in such bad faith, the argument that double jeopardy should bar further proceedings whether or not the jury was sworn, or the argument that further proceedings would violate the defendant’s due process rights might very well succeed. See Schulhofer, [Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U.Pa.L.Rev. 449,] 513 [ (1977) ] (“The due process clause presumably affords protection during the voir dire period against a mistrial deliberately induced to deprive the defendant of a potentially favorable panel.”). For now, however, it is enough to note that the present case does not involve the envisioned horrible of a trial judge’s effort to get a hanging jury.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. Diaz v. State · 591 So. 2d 977 - Fassi v. State

2. “"I add the observation that this conclusion may not mean that the defendant is wholly without constitutional remedy. Almost without question, Koenig was deliberately deprived of a recognized, protectable, `valued' right to be tried by a regularly constituted jury in whose selection he had participated and the composition of which he obviously approved. See Crist [v. Bretz ], 437 U.S. 28, 37 , 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2166 , 57 L.Ed.2d 24 , (1978) .... [c.o.] Particularly since, as is also self-evident, the reason that this occurred was based solely upon the perceived undesirability of the jury itself, thus implicating and contravening the very reason for the existence of the right, the trial court's action may have deprived the appellant of his generalized fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to due process. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971) (although sixth amendment right to speedy trial does not arise until arrest or formal accusation, pre-arrest delay may constitute due process violation if actuated by constitutionally impermissible purpose); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 , 104 S.Ct. 2292 , 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (same). See generally Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 547-48, nn. 2-5 , 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1919-20, nn. 2-5 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 , 436-37 nn. 2-5 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) (collecting cases in which intent of state officials is deemed pertinent in determining whether various constitutional rights and privileges have be”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Goodman

3. “If, however, the trial court discharges the unsworn jury in bad faith and the policies behind the double jeopardy clause are implicated, as, for example, where the aborted voir dire particularly has revealed the intended defense to the advantage of the prosecution, or further delay of the trial will aid the prosecution, double jeopardy may preclude further proceedings.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 591 So. 2d 977 - Fassi v. State