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← 498 F.2d 1173 - Brown v. DeLayo

Brown v. DeLayo’s Empirical Analysis

498 F.2d 1173 · 1974

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
4
states following
December 1989
most recently cited

15 federal appellate · 5 district · 5 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Commissioner v. Sunnen · Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation · Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers · Davis v. Alaska · Palmore v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““The issue is not res judicata because that principle ‘applies to repetitious suits involving the same cause of action.’ Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 , 68 S.Ct. 715, 719 , 92 L.Ed. 898 . The §§ 1981 and 1983 claims presented here were not before the state courts. However, the state claims and the present civil rights claims all depend on the determination of the question of whether the teacher was denied due process. In this situation the judgment in the prior actions ‘operates as an estoppel * * * “as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.” ’ Ibid, at 598, 68 S.Ct. 715 . The principle of collateral estoppel by judgment precludes the relitigation of matters litigated and determined in a prior proceeding. Ibid. « * * * a prior state court adjudication of a federal constitutional right bars a subsequent federal action seeking vindication of the same right. Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Properties, Inc., 10 Cir., 480 F.2d 536, 538 . The rule applies even though the federal action is brought under §§ 1981 and 1983. The Civil Rights Act is not a vehicle for a collateral attack on a final state court judgment. Bricker v. Crane, 1 Cir., 468 F.2d 1228, 1231 , cert. denied 410 U.S. 930 , 93 S.Ct. 1368 , 35 L.Ed.2d 592 . See also Parker v. McKeithen, 5 Cir., 488 F.2d 553, 557-558 ; Tang v. Appellate Division of New York Supreme Court, First Department, 2 Cir., 487 F.2d 138”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “The change in identity of parties because of inclusions and exclusions of certain New Mexico boards and officials is of no moment. The application of collateral estoppel in federal courts is not grounded upon the “mechanical requirements of mutuality.” PI Enterprises v. Cataldo, 1 Cir., 457 F.2d 1012, 1015 . The test is whether a litigant has had a “full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution” of the issue. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., [sic] v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328, 329 , 91 S.Ct. 1434 [1442, 1443], 28 L.Ed.2d 788 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.