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← 498 F.3d 344 - Richey v. Bradshaw

Richey v. Bradshaw’s Empirical Analysis

498 F.3d 344 · 2007

Citation profile

40
cited by 40 later decisions
6
states following
August 2024
most recently cited

14 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 40 later decisions — most recently August 2024 · most notably Fautenberry v. Mitchell (2008), Moore v. Mitchell (2013)

14 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

280200720102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)

Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Coleman v. Thompson · United States v. Frady · Wiggins v. Smith, Warden · Bell Warden v. Cone

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 40 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"The scientific evidence of arson was * * * fundamental to the State's case. Yet Richey's counsel did next to nothing to determine if the State's arson conclusion was impervious to attack. True, Richey's counsel retained DuBois to review the State's arson evidence, so this case does not exemplify that most egregious type, wherein lawyers altogether fail to hire an expert. But the mere hiring of an expert is meaningless if counsel does not consult with that expert to make an informed decision about whether a particular defense is viable. [Citation.] At bottom, the record shows Richey's counsel did not conduct the investigation that a reasonably competent lawyer would have conducted into an available defense—that the fire was not caused by arson—before deciding not to mount that defense. 'A lawyer who fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce into evidence, information that demonstrates his client's factual innocence, or that raises sufficient doubts as to that question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient performance.' [Citation.] Here, Richey's counsel appeared unconcerned about the State's scientific evidence from the very beginning. Although he was aware of the State's arson theory in July, Kluge did not contact DuBois until September and did not authorize him to begin work on the case until mid-November, just two months before the start of trial. By the time DuBois advised Kluge in December that he agreed entirely with the State, Kluge might ha”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “... we can discern no strategic reason why counsel would have so readily ceded this terrain to the prosecution. Nor was it sufficient for counsel to attempt to poke holes in the State’s arson case by focusing on the identity of the arsonist. At the very least, Richey’s comments ... and the defense’s failure to point the finger at any other possible culprit, made such a choice unreasonable.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “A lawyer cannot be deemed effective when he hires an expert consultant and then either wilfully or negligently keeps himself in the dark about what that expert is doing, and what the basis for the expert's opinion is.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.