Catina v. Maree’s Empirical Analysis
1982
Citation profile
24 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 24 later decisions — most recently December 2018
24 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Brady v. United States · United States v. Taylor · Kline v. Kachmar · United States v. Allain · Commonwealth v. Marino
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““As a general rule, one who calls a witness is required to elicit on his first (direct) examination all that is wished to be proved by that witness — such rule is manifestly in the interests of fairness and expedition of litigation. McCormick, Evidence section 32, Redirect and Subse quent Examinations (West 2d Ed. 1972). While there is division of authority on the scope of cross-examination between jurisdictions favoring restrictive cross (as in Pennsylvania: see generally, Kline v. Kachmar, 360 Pa. 396 , 61 A.2d 825 (1948) and those allowing ‘wide-open’ cross, no such division exists as regards redirect and subsequent examinations; as to these subsequent examinations, the practice is uniform that the party’s examination is limited to answering only such matter as was drawn out in the immediately preceding examination of the adversary.” (emphasis in original)”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“It is obvious that, while the usual order for introducing topics of evidence and witnesses is a desirable thing, a variation from that order, which is often equally desirable, will not necessarily cause direct harm; it can do so only where it tends to confuse the jury, or where it misleads the opponent and finds him unprepared to meet it. Moreover, the necessity for such a variation and likelihood that it will confuse or mislead must depend entirely upon the particular circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it is a cardinal doctrine, applicable generally to all of the ensuing rules, that they are not invariable, that they are directory rather than mandatory, and that an alteration of the prescribed customary order is always allowable in the discretion of the trial court.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent“while lay witnesses are permitted to express estimates of vehicle speed in numerical terms, terms such as `fast,' `slow' or `excessive' and the like have been found to be conclusory in nature as well as lacking in evidentiary value.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.