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5 Ark. 23

Walker v. Jefferson

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Decided January 15, 1843

Supreme Court of Arkansas · decided 1843-01-15

This was an action of trespass, determined in the Benton Circuit Court, in May, 1842, before the Hon. Joseph M. Hoge, one of the circuit judges. Jefferson sued Duckworth, Beebe, Clark, Braithwaite, John G. and William T. Walker, in the first count, for trespass guare clausum fregit, alleged to have been committed on the N. W. i of sec. 32, T. 20 N., R. 30 W.; and, in the second count, for taking and carrying away 3000 bushels of corn. Process was served on ali the defendants.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1843-01-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently June 1959

6 state decisions

10184318501860187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1By the Court,

Paschal, J.

¶2The whole proceedings are exceedingly irregular, and the judgment thus rendered is certainly illegal. It is exceedingly doubtful whether the Circuit Court possesses the power to give a party to a subsequent term to show cause against the granting of a new trial. We regard such a practice as irregular, and one which should not be indulged, unless there were peculiar circumstances justifying it. Such a practice íb certainly in contravention of the practice governing the Circuit Courts, as prescribed in the Revised Statutes, p. 637, sec. 132.

¶3It is perfectly clear, however, that the Court has no power over the cause, should the term at which the motion was to have been heard, expire (as in this instance) without any steps being taken. It was held by this Court, in Smith vs. Dudley, 2 Ark. Rep. 66, “ that when judgment has been pronounced, and the term at which it was given has finally expired, neither the Court nor the parties to the record have any longer any control over it.” There was no entry in this case showing any disposition of the cause at the term at which the rule to show cause against the new trial was to have been heard and determined; and, consequently, at the term thereafter, the Court possessed no authority whatever to revive a rule which had expired by its own limitation, at a former term. The rule was finally lost and destroyed, when the term expired at which it was to have been heard; and it could not afterwards be revived or brought into being by any assumed power over it; much less could the Court go on to set aside the new trial previously granted, and enter a nolle prosequi as to two defendants, and render a judgment as to the other four. The whole proceeding was unwarranted by any principle of law or practice.

¶4Judgment reversed.

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