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← 5 F.3d 285 - Gamble v. Eau Claire County

Gamble v. Eau Claire County’s Empirical Analysis

5 F.3d 285 · 1993

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
2
states following
March 2020
most recently cited

32 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2020 · most notably River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park (1994), Hager v. City of West Peoria (1996)

32 federal appellate · 3 state decisions

2801993200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Illinois v. Gates · Parratt v. Taylor · Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City · Steffel v. Thompson · Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[The substantive due process] approach has its greatest appeal when the state acts outside its eminent domain powers, for example by taking property for a private rather than for a public use. Suppose a state passed a law which said that the governor could take away a person’s home and give it to his brother-in-law. It could be argued that such a law, even if meticulously enforced in accordance with the requirements of due process in the sense of fair procedure, would, if the law were as arbitrary and unreasonable as it seemed, deprive the homeowner of property without due process of law. Statutes or other exertions of governmental power that lack a rational basis, in the sense of some connection however tenuous to some at least minimally plausible conception of the public interest, are held to violate due process even if there is no procedural irregularity; so if they deprive someone of life, liberty, or property, they give rise to a claim under the due process clause. When land is taken for a private rather than public use, a rational basis for the government’s action, it may be argued, is lacking. The fact that the landowner has an alternative right, one to just compensation, need not be decisive, when it is understood that the purpose of the just-compensation requirement is, ... to enable government to acquire property cheap — for bare market value, extinguishing all additional value, sentimental or otherwise, that the landowner might attach to the property — on condition”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[U]ntil he exhausts his remedies for obtaining a compensation award or equivalent relief from the state... [a landowner] cannot know whether he has suffered the only type of harm for which the just-compensation provision of the Constitution entitles him to a remedy.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[A] landowner cannot complain that his constitutional right [to just compensation for a taking] has been denied until he exhausts his remedies for obtaining a compensation award or equivalent relief from the state.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.