5 Ill. 2d 417 - Farkas v. Williams’s Empirical Analysis
1955
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 2 district · 52 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 66 later decisions — most recently June 2020 · most notably 73 Ill. 2d 342 - Johnson v. La Grange State Bank (1978), 54 Ill. 2d 532 - Montgomery v. Michaels (1973)
7 federal appellate · 2 district · 52 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Van Cott v. . Prentice · Gurnett v. Mutual Life Insurance · Bear v. Millikin Trust Co. · Kelly v. Parker · Oswald v. Caldwell
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 66 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“‘Often the grantor-settlor holds back for himself the power to manage the property directly and indirectly. He provides that he himself shall have power to sell, lease, mortgage, pay taxes, make investments, and perform other acts of trust administration, or that he shall have authority to direct the trustees how they shall perform these duties. These reservations have not generally been deemed to show that the grantor remains during his life the master of the property to such an extent as to make his gift to the cestuis testamentary. So long as the trust continues, the cestuis have equitable interests, no matter who acts for them in protecting those interests, whether it be trustee or settlor. If the exercise of these powers by the settlor involves the total or partial destruction of the trust, as where the settlor has power to sell the res and keep the proceeds, the power seems to be treated as practically that of revocation of the trust. It leaves an equitable interest in the cestui till revocation. It shows a vested interest, subject to divestment, and not the lack of any interest at all.’ ” Farkas v. Williams (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 417, 431 , 125 N.E.2d 600, 607-08 , citing I Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §104, at 484-85. See also Scott, Trusts §57.2, at 480 (3d ed. 1967) (settlor’s reservation of a life interest, power to revoke or modify, and power to control the trustee in the administration of trust does not render the trust testamentary); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §57”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““But considering the terms of these instruments we believe Farkas did intend to presently give Williams an interest in the property referred to. For it may be said, at the very least, that upon his executing one of these instruments, he showed an intention to presently part with some of the incidents of ownership in the stock. Immediately after the execution of each of these instruments, he could not deal with the stock therein referred to the same as if he owned the property absolutely, but only in accordance with the terms of the instrument. *** Thus assuming to act as trustee, he is held to have intended to take on those obligations which are expressly set out in the instrument, as well as those fiduciary obligations implied by law. In addition, he manifested an intention to bind himself to having this property pass upon his death to Williams, unless he changed the beneficiary or revoked the trust ***. It seems to follow that what incidents of ownership Farkas intended to relinquish, in a sense he intended Williams to acquire. That is, Williams was to be beneficiary to whom Farkas was to be obligated, and unless Farkas revoked the instrument in the manner therein set out or the instrument was otherwise terminated in a manner therein provided for, upon Farkas’ death Williams was to become absolute owner of the trust property. It is difficult to name this interest of Williams, nor is there any reason for so doing so long as it passed to him immediately upon the creation of t”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“In considering the one trust wherein Garrett fixed the termination date to be one year after the death of the settlor, the federal court further ruled such pro■vision did not make the trust instrument testamentary, since the trust terms had passed an interest in the res to the beneficiaries during the life of the set-tlor, even though possession or enjoyment thereof was postponed until the death of the settlor. Id. at 465 . The court further recognized that the policy of the law favors the vesting of interests and, where possible, Avill construe a provision as a condition subsequent in preference to a condition precedent. Id.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.