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5 Munf. 34

Howatt & Co. v. Davis

Supreme Court of Virginia

Decided February 9, 1816

Supreme Court of Virginia · decided 1816-02-09

<p>1. In case of a sale of personal property not executed by delivery, but to be consummated by delivery at another place ; although, in consequence of ear* nest paid,or otherwise, the property be so vested in the buyer, that, on complying or offering to comply with the contract on his part, he may recover the same from the seller or his agent$ yet, untiiraelivery, and while the goods are (in legal phrase,) in transitu, the seller may, on the buyers becoming bankrupt, or being likely to be so, arrest the goods, or order his agent to arrest them ; which order, operating as an indemnity to the agent in addition to that arising from his possession of the goods, will be his guarantee for refusing to deliver them ; and? perhaps, under circumstances, the agent would also have a right to demand other security from his principal*, which it would be incumbent on him forthwith to give, under nain of a risht in the aeent to cro on. and execute the contract bv a delivery.</p> <p>2. If a factor, or agent,'having sold goods belonging to his principal, be ordered by him while they are yetin transitu, not to deliverthcm to Urn buyer, of whose solvency doubts are entertained, and he deliver them notwithstanding such order, and without demanding security for his indemnity 5 the principal is entitled to an action against him, in case the buyer should prove insolvent.</p> <p>3. And such right of action is not waived or abandoned by expressions used in letters from the principal after the delivery of the goods, seeming to import an agreement to look to the buyer for payment, and not to the factor; nor by the principal’s permitting considerable time to elapse before he informs the factor, categorically, that lie will look to him, and not to the buyer for Satisfaction : provided such expressions and such delay, on the part of the principal, may have been occasioned by the factors failing to make a full and fair disclosure of all facts and circumstances necessary to enable the principal to decide upon the subject, and which it was the duty, and in the power, of the factor to haye given.</p>

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently January 1876

1 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1816-02-09

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¶1February, 19th, 1816.

Judge Roane

¶2pronounced the. court’s opinion.

¶3The court is of opinion, that, by the general principles of law, a factor or agent is bound to pursue the lawful instructions of his principal; and that, by his agent, a principal can do any act, in relation to the subject delegated, which he might lawfully do by himself. The court is farther of opinion that, in case of a sale of personal property not executed by delivery, and to be consummated by a delivery at another place, although in consequence of earnest paid, or otherwise, !h” properly is so vested in the vendee, that, on complying or offering to comply with the contract on his part, he may recover the same from the vendor, or his agent; yet ihai, until delivery, and while the goods are, in legal phrase, in transitu the seller mny, on the vendee’s becoming bankrupt, or being likely to become so, arrest the goods, or order his agent to arrest them ; which order operating as an indemnity to the agent, in addition lo that arising from his possession of the goods, will be his guarantee for refusing to deliver them ; and that the agent would also have a right, perhaps, under circumstances, to demand other security from his principal, which it would be incumbent on him forthwdh to give, under pain of a right in the agent to go on, and execute the contract by a delivery.

¶4*38Under the influehce of these principles, the court is oí’ opinion, that it was the duty of the appellants to have complied w'ith the order of the appellees in this case, by refusing to deliver the tobacco to John Cotvpcr & Co., which is stated and ref;erred to in the case agreed.

¶5The court is farther of opinion, that the appellants not having done this, but, on the contrary, having violated the said order by a delivery of the tobacco to Cotvpcr & Co., they were liable to the action of the appellees, in the event of Comper’s insolvency, to make them reparation in damages; which right of action, however, might he waived and abandoned by the appellees, after a full and fair disclosure of all facts and circumstances necessary for their decision upon the subject, which it was the duty and in the power of the appellants to have given. The court, referring to the facts agreed in the case in relation to this point, is of opinion that, although, standing singly, there may be some expressions, seeming to import an agreement by the appellees to look to Cotvpcr & Co., and not to the appellants, for payment, used in their letters written after the delivery of the tobacco by the appellants to Cotvpcr & Co.; and although a considerable time elapsed before the appellees stated, categorically, to the appellants, that they should look to them, and not to Comper & Co. for satisfaction; these circumstances are not strong enough to induce the court to infer such waiver and abandonment in the present instance.

¶6The case states that, at the time of the delivery of the tobacco, John Comper & Co. were “ in fact insolvent, though this “ was not then certainly known to the appellants.” Although this was not certainly known to them, we are authorized to infer from the case, that the appellants had, on the Gth, (when the tobacco was delivered,) good reason to believe that such insolvency existed; and if so, while it formed an additional’reason for the appellants to decline a delivery of the tobacco, they ought also, even then, to have given this information to the appellees. This is a stronger degree of evidence, in relation to a bankruptcy, than a mere protest of bills, which may happen sometimes to men of the best mercantile credit. The last circumstance, however, only, and not the other and stronger evidence from which the appellants knew, though they did not certainly know, that Camper & Co. were then insolvent, was comma* *39..heated by the appellants to the appellees; and that, too, accompanied by some expressions indicating a hope that Com-per's affaire might noí be so bail a3 was apprehended. It was under this degree of info-mil ion that the appellees acted in using the expressions now referred !o„ But, at any rate, after the 8 th of September, when it is agreed that Comper & Co’s, insolvency was ascertained, and that they had stopped payment ¡, it was the duty of the appellants to have given instant information thereof to the appellees. For want of such information, and from the character of the appellants’ letters, the appellees may have been lured into a belief that they might get payment from Conipir & Co. Hence the expressions in their letters now referred to may have arisen; and hence, also, the delay in stating to the appellants tiiai they looked only to them in this business. Both this delay, anil these expressions, may therefore have arisen from the conduct of the appellants, in withholding or palliating the actual circumstances of the case; and therefore ought not to avail them in. the present instance, '.’here has not been such a prompt, frank, and explicit communication on their part, as should, on the ground of these expressions and this delay, absolve them from a right of action which had previously attached against them.

¶7On these grounds, the court is of opinion to affirm the jndgment.

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