Sadleir v. Knapton

¶1Defendant, Melvin G. Knapton, appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict awarding $8,000 general and $2,000 punitive damages to plaintiff Earl W. Sadleir for alienation of his wife’s affections.

¶2Plaintiff and defendant knew each other in high school, they joined the Navy as Radar Cadets at the same time and spent their time in the service in the same units, had the same leave periods, were discharged and returned home at the same time and place, and were fast friends thereafter. Plaintiff married Vera Smith, on June 19, 1947, some time after his discharge from the service. Two daughters from that marriage are now living; one was five and the other three years old at the time of this trial. Plaintiff took employment as a mail clerk. After the marriage, defendant was a frequent visitor in their home. From the beginning of 1952 until plaintiff’s wife left him on January 8, 1954, plaintiff’s employment kept him from home from the middle of the afternoon until almost 12:00 at night for five days each week. During this time defendant visited plaintiff’s wife while he was absent nearly every evening and would leave shortly before plaintiff’s return home.

¶3In December of 1953, plaintiff’s wife revealed to him that she was “moody” for defendant. On January 6, 1954, plaintiff arranged a meeting with defendant to discuss his relations with Mrs. Sadleir. They met about ten o’clock in the morning and had a discussion in plaintiff’s car in front of the Kearns Building where defendant was employed. At that meeting defendant agreed to discontinue his visits with plaintiff’s wife and to come to plaintiff’s home and in the presence of both of them tell her that he did not love her and that he was going to discontinue his visits. Accordingly, on *28January 8, 1954, defendant called at their home and met with plaintiff and his wife, but instead of telling her he did not love her and that he was going to discontinue his visits, he told her that he did love her and wanted to marry her and agreed to support her until she could obtain a divorce and pay for the divorce and then marry her when the divorce was final. Thereupon Mrs. Sadleir left plaintiff’s home and discontinued living with him, taking the children with her, and immediately thereafter commenced divorce proceedings. Sadleir defaulted in the divorce action and on February 26, 1954, his wife was awarded a divorce and the custody of the children. Plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant for alienation of his former wife’s affections on March 27, 1954, and defendant married plaintiff’s former wife soon after the divorce became final.

¶4Appellant contends that plaintiff forfeited his right to a judgment in this case under section 30-3-9, U.C.A.1953, which provides that “When a divorce is decreed the guilty party forfeits all rights acquired by marriage.” This question is one of first impression in this court but Iowa has construed an identical statute1 in accordance with appellant’s contention.2 On the other-hand Missouri, in construing a statute which is similar to ours on all material points, has held that it deals only with the-rights as between the parties to the marriage and does not operate to protect a guilty third party from the consequences of' his own wrongful acts.3

¶5Except that it fixes the marriage status of the parties thereto and the right of custody of the children, it is clear that the divorce decree is not res judicata of' the issues in this case because the defendant was not a party to that action. Nor is. plaintiff in any way estopped as against the defendant here by that decree.4 Appellant does not so contend. He simply -contends’, that plaintiff was adjudicated the “guilty party” in the divorce action and under the-provisions of the above section 30-3-9, U.. C.A. 1953, he forfeited the rights he now claims against defendant because such rights were “acquired by marriage.” He-points out that the parties cannot by mutual consent dissolve a marriage,5 that a. *29court will not knowingly grant a divorce on collusion of the parties or perjured testimony, nor by default without evidence taken in the cause supporting the decree.6 He contends that this shows a legislative intention, in order to prevent divorce by agreement, collusion or perjury, to deprive the party adjudicated “guilty” of all rights resulting from the marriage even as against third parties. This argument overlooks the fact that this section is «a part of our divorce laws which deal exclusively with the rights of the parties to the marriage as between them and has nothing to do with the rights against third parties. The State is not interested in perpetuating a marriage after all possibility of accomplishing any desirable purpose of such relationship is gone, nor does sound policy require in such cases a bitter contest for divorce.

¶6So we hold that the rights which plaintiff claims against defendant were not “rights acquired by marriage” under the meaning of those terms as they were used in our statute. Although the right against alienation of his wife’s affections could not exist if there had been no marriage because there would be no wife’s affections to alienate, still this is not of the class of marital rights acquired by the immediate parties thereto by reason of the marriage. It is a right arising out of that relationship as a protection against third parties who might wrongfully interfere with it. It is recognized by the law for the purpose of protecting the sanctity of the family by awarding compensation to those aggrieved by such wrongful conduct and as a warning to intermeddlers that married women are out of bounds and thereby protect the marriage relationship. We therefore hold that this right which plaintiff seeks to enforce against defendant in this action is not the kind of right which the statute in question intended should be forfeited by the person adjudicated to be the guilty party in a divorce action.

¶7Appellant raises a number of other points which after careful consideration we conclude clearly do not require a reversal of this case. This is especially true in view of our decision on the above point and what we said in the case of Wilson v. Oldroyd.7

¶8Affirmed. Respondent to recover his costs of this appeal.

¶16(concurring).

¶17I concur, but in addition to the reasons stated in Justice WADE’S opinion, desire to add the following:

¶18The right of a husband to bring an action for alienation of affections of his wife is a fundamental common-law right, which is uniformly recognized by authorities and *30text writers,1 except that in some states it has been abolished by statute.2 Our legislature has not seen fit to make any enactment in that regard.

¶19To give the statute referred to the effect contended for by defendant would bring about anomalous results inconsistent with the purpose which gave rise to the right of action for alienation of affections. For instance, if the illicit suitor, wooing a married woman, did not fully succeed in destroying the marriage to the extent a divorce was procured, a cause of action for alienation of affections would exist against ■him, whereas, if he succeeded in completely destroying the marriage, then the cause of action would be obliterated by the application of this statute. This would have the effect of rewarding the greater wrongdoer for success in his nefarious efforts, and penalize one not quite so successful.

¶20Another consideration is that if the illicit suitor should suffer remorse of conscience in the course of his wooing, he •could see a danger in repenting and desisting because he would ¡be vulnerable to suit for alienation of affections, whereas if he continued and succeeded in destroying the marriage by getting a divorce granted he would be protected from such suit. This would tend to discourage one from rectifying his conduct and encourage him to continue with his improper designs.

¶21Furthermore, such an application of the statute would pose a dilemma to the aggrieved husband. If the suitor did not succeed in stealing the wife’s affections to the point of the divorce, then the latter could defend on the ground that the husband had not in fact lost his wife’s affections because he still had his wife. It would be very unusual, if not inconceivable, that a husband would sue for alienation of affections while still married to his wife. On the other hand, if the divorce was in fact granted, the suitor could defend on the ground that the right “acquired by marriage,” to sue f-or alienation of affections had been nullified by reason of the statute.

¶22For the foregoing reasons it is clear that it would be incongruous and inconsistent with the purpose for which the right was first recognized, and continues to exist, to accept the interpretation appellant contends for of the statute in question. It seems to me unquestionable that it is to be considered in context with the other statutes in the *31title on Husband and Wife and that it relates solely to their rights inter se.