¶2I concur in the holding that under the facts here the plaintiffs are not entitled to have a decree quieting title to the property. However, in regard to this subject I deem *365it advisable to add a further comment. The right to a homestead set out by our Constitution 1 and statutes 2is absolute, and its ■claimant may deal with it in any manner he sees fit.3 This is an important privilege which should not be circumvented by making it impractical to use. The problem arises: when a judgment debtor desires to sell property which he claims as a homestead, how can he accomplish it unless a court will declare that it is a homestead and therefore exempt from the lien of a subsisting judgment. Even though his property may be valued at less than his homestead exemption, a prospective purchaser may be reluctant to accept title unless there is some record assurance that it is properly ■claimed as a homestead and exempt from the judgment lien. It therefore seems essential that the court should adjudicate that at a given time a claimant is entitled to a ■homestead in property he designates for such purpose if the existing facts bring him within the provisions of law relating thereto. Such an adjudication of the propriety of -the declaration of homestead at a given time seems necessary to carry out the homestead purpose.4 On the other hand, it seems that the permanent enjoining of the enforcement of the judgment lien against the property, based on the facts existing at any particular time, may improperly preclude the attachment of the judgment lien to the property when the decrease of encumbrances against the property, its enhancement in value, the acquisition of additional property by the debtor, or the diminution of his family which would reduce his homestead value, might later permit the judgment lien to attach if the debtor continued to hold the property.
