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5 Vt. 390

Wright v. Doolittle

Supreme Court of Vermont

Decided February 15, 1833

Supreme Court of Vermont · decided 1833-02-15

The complainant, in this case, came before the County Court, in Windham County, at the September Term of 1832, with a complaint, setting forth, that the said Oliver Doolittle 2d did, on the 30th day of August, A. D. 1832, pray out a writ of ejectment against the said Wright, and cause the same to be served upon the said Wright on the day and year aforesaid, by one Elijah Stebbins, Constable of the town of Vernon, in said County, — wherein the said Wright was directed to be…

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1833-02-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently February 1886

3 state decisions

10183318401850186018701880decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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¶1The opinion of the Court was pronounced by

Hutchinson, C. J.

¶2It would be unreasonable, that a plaintiff in any suit newly commenced, should have no way in his power to stop such suit, without paying the cost of Court. He may commence the suit in good faith, yet af-terwards discover some mistake, which must render thg suit abortive. Hence this Court decided in the case, reported from Washington County, Mead, complainant, vs. *392Arms, that a notice in writing from. Arms to Mead, that he should not enter nor prosecute such suit, and this notice "given when- no taxable cost had accrued in favor of Mead, furnished a sufficient reason for refusing Mead the taxable cost of his coming, to Court with his complaint to obtain such cost. The Court considered that written notice was ample security against any prosecution of the suit by Arms.

Hayes, for the.complainant.Fhdps, for the- complainee.

¶3We are now called upon to attach the same effect to a verbal notice. We think this would be unreasonable.— It would subject the defendant to the risk of the life of the person who receives and delivers the message : also to the rjsk of the recollection and veracity of such person. And, even if these objections were obviated, there- is one more risk, that of this person’s continuing to reside where his testimony could be obtained-. If he trusted to such verbal notice, and remained contented without attending Court, and the action should still be entered and defaulted, all possible relief would rest on so many and so uncertain contingencies, no man should be subjected to them against his consent. The reasons, given by this Court in the case of Mead and Arms, apply to no case, except where the -n’otice is.in, writing, and is of itself sufficient evidence of his authority-'to- remain quietly-at home, as he might if no-writ had been served upon him.

¶4We consider' this to be the only rule that would be just aid practicable.

¶5The judgement of the County Court is affirmed.

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