5 Wash. App. 214 - Simpson v. May’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “However, before it can properly be submitted to the jury there must be at least some evidence introduced indicating that the plaintiff knew of the specific character of the risk, which if known might have caused him to reevaluate his voluntarily entering into the risk-creating situation. In other words, the defense requires more than a generalized feeling that there may be some hazard involved. To illustrate, one who attends, a baseball game may be precluded from recovering for damages suffered when hit by a ball or broken bat. See, e.g., Kavafian v. Seattle Baseball Club Ass’n, 105 Wash. 215 , 177 P. 776 , 181 P. 679 (1919). This preclusion may apply even if the circumstances leading to the injury were somewhat bizarre. He would not be precluded from recovering for damages from a collapsing' grandstand or from eating tainted concession food unless he knew of this specific risk and voluntarily accepted .these risks. . . . We held that just because the plaintiff may have been aware of a generalized hazard, does not necessarily mean that he assumed “an extraórdinary risk” from spilled water on the race track which he may or may not have known about. As we stated in that case, “[i]n order for the ‘volenti’ doctrine to be applicable, plaintiff must have voluntarily exposed himself to a known and appreciated danger.” Regan v. Seattle, supra, at 507. When there was no evidence introduced that the plaintiff was aware of the factors leading to the “extraordinary risk,” a volenti inst”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 6 Wash. App. 885 - Wood v. Postelthwaite

2. “We do not find this ruling inconsistent with subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court which, while recognizing the doctrine of volenti, hold that it does not apply in cases where the injury to plaintiff results from an extraordinary risk of which plaintiff could not have knowledge or appreciation. Regan v. Seattle, 76 Wn.2d 501 , 458 P.2d 12 (1969); Hogenson v. Service Armament Co., 77 Wn.2d 209 , 461 P.2d 311 (1969). On the other hand, since Carabba [Carabba v. Anacortes School Dist. 103, 72 Wn.2d 939 , 435 P.2d 936 (1967) ] both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have not only recognized the defense of “volenti” but approved its application. See Detrick v. Garretson Packing Co., 73 Wn.2d 804 , 440 P.2d 834 (1968); Martin v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1 Wn. App. 463 , 462 P.2d 981 (1969); and Stark v. Allis-Chalmer s & Northwest Roads, Inc., 2 Wn. App. 399 , 467 P.2d 854 (1970). We conclude the defense of “volenti” has not yet been abolished in this state. .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 6 Wash. App. 885 - Wood v. Postelthwaite

3. “opens a very wide door for the plaintiff who is willing to testify that he did not know or understand the risk; . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Runnings v. Ford Motor Co.