¶1(dissenting)—The principal question in this case simply stated is: Does the interest of the citizens of the state of Washington in the preservation of the integrity of the American flag transcend the desire of appellant to publicly proclaim his political views by the use of that flag as a backdrop or billboard? I believe the essential purpose of the flag should be preserved and that our state government has properly prohibited the use which appellant would make of it.
¶2In essence, appellant’s argument is that he has a right protected by the First Amendment to employ the American flag to express and convey his ideas and to make alterations to the flag best suited to his purposes. There is no doubt that an American flag so' employed will attract attention and that a message placed thereon either in words or by symbol will be broadcast.
¶3*768Freedom of speech is not beyond all control. A state interest 'and the general good may take precedence over the exercise of unfettered personal liberty. The test for determining whether a public interest is superior to the individual’s exercise of free speech is stated in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968) as follows:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
¶4The statute in question is well within the requirements of these criteria.
¶5The United States Supreme Court in Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 51 L. Ed. 696, 27 S. Ct. 419 (1907), decided that a state may prevent the misuse of the American flag, not only to prevent breaches of the peace generated thereby, but also because
[i]t is not extravagant to say that to all lovers of the country it [the flag] signifies government resting on the consent of the governed; liberty regulated by law; the protection of the weak against the strong; security against the exercise of arbitrary power; and absolute safety for free institutions against foreign aggression. As the statute in question evidently had its origin in a purpose to cultivate a feeling of patriotism among the people of Nebraska, we are unwilling to adjudge that in legislation for that purpose the State erred in duty or has infringed the constitutional right of anyone. On the contrary, it may reasonably be affirmed that a duty rests upon each State in every legal way to encourage its people to love the Union with which the State is indissolubly connected.
¶6Should the law be, as contended by appellant, .that each citizen under the guise of “symbolic speech,” is free to mutilate or disfigure the flag to express his ideas, good or bad, then the essential purpose of the flag, which Woodrow *769Wilson called “the emblem of our unity, our power, our thought, and our purpose as a nation,” will be destroyed. M. Krythe, What So Proudly We Hail 26 (1968). The interest of every citizen as well as that of the state of Washington in the preservation of the flag, unmarked and unsullied, overrides appellant’s privilege of citizenship and his personal liberty merely to the extent that he must find some other means, of which many are available, to express his ideas. See Joyce v. United States, 454 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1971); People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114, 308 N.Y.S.2d 846, 257 N.E.2d 30 (1970), aff’g by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 864, 28 L. Ed. 2d 287, 91 S. Ct. 1217 (1971).
¶7Our Supreme Court in State v. Oyen, 78 Wn.2d 909, 918, 480 P.2d 766 (1971) had this to say:
In applying the concept in situations where freedom of speech may be concerned, it is essential to bear in mind that an otherwise valid statute, which, in protecting important societal interests, makes a particular course of conduct illegal, does not run 'afoul of the constitution merely because the right of free speech may be intermingled with the condemned conduct. Cox v. Louisiana, supra,[379 U.S. 536, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471, 85 S. Ct. 453 (1965)]; United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 2d 672, 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 20 L. Ed. 2d 182, 88 S. Ct. 1335 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 17 L. Ed. 2d 149. 87 S. Ct. 242 (1966); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 93 L. Ed. 513, 69 S. Ct. 448 (1949).
In such situations, however, it is incumbent upon the court to weigh the purported impairment of speech engendered by the statutory provision against the importance of the societal interest sought to be. vindicated by the statute, as well as the nature and extent of the threat which the statutorily forbidden conduct poses to that interest. And, too, the alternatives available to the state and the claimant must be evaluated, ie., whether the state may achieve its ends in a less restrictive manner and/or the claimant effect his communication in a way less detrimental to the societal interest.
¶8As seen, the statute protects an important societal interest, whereas appellant has suffered a very slight impair*770ment of Ms method of expression and no strictures on speaking, writing, or conveying his ideas by any other means. Oyenis a much more provocative case than the one presented here, because the defendants in Oyenwere arrested for engaging in pamphleteering, one of the truly historical methods of public dissemination of political views. The Supreme Court applying the test above set out held that even though the pamphleteering was conducted on a walkway outside of school buildings, it must yield to the interest of the state in maintaining a scholastic atmosphere for students of the school.
¶9As to appellant’s contention that the statute does not meet the constitutional test of due process because it is vague, I believe that it is sufficiently definite to inform a person with reasonable precision what acts are prohibited, so that he may have a certain, understandable rule of conduct and know what acts he must avoid. State v. Oyen, supra.
¶10It is of no importance that appellant was 'arrested for violation of a flag misuse law rather than one for desecration containing an element of contemptuous intent because the power of the state to further the peoples’ interest by protecting the flag may be exercised irrespective of evil or malice. State v. Turner, 78 Wn.2d 276, 474 P.2d 91 (1970). The statute with which we are concerned has for its purpose the preservation of unmarked national and state symbols. The prohibition is against all disfigurement, no matter how noble the thought behind it.
¶11Freedom of speech does not, in my view, include freedom to publicly use the American flag in the manner employed by appellant, in the face of an acknowledged societal interest in the flag. Although it may be important to appellant to express his views in this novel way, he should remember that the United States, as symbolized by the American flag, is important too.
¶12The judgment should be affirmed.
¶13Petition for rehearing demed December 17,1971.
¶14Appealed to Supreme Court December 27,1971.