!lITCUoocte 11. QALVESTONWlIARI' 00.
263
case by the demurrer to the complaint, as well as the plea in bar. Said Section 5 provides. . "That aPP,eals or writs oterror may be taken trom the district courts or from the existing circuit courts direct to tbesuprElllie court In tblHoJlowing C3Se8': In any whiCh the jurisdictioDoNhedourt is at issue. .In such cases jurisdiction ",lone shall be CfrtiUed to the supreme court from the court below for decision." appea,ls cannot be the "court below" here meant. The statute is. providiJ;lg forappel11s or error from the district and circuit courts, and court of appeals, and the "court below" must be one ofthese. In Mclii8h v. Roff, 141 U. S. 968; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. U8, the supreme !JaY: court, . .. When that judgment [final] is .rendered, the party against whom It Is rendered mUllt'electwhether he will take his writ of error or appeal to the supreme court .upon the question of jurisdiction alone, or to the circuit court ot appeals upon tbe.whole case.; If the latter, then the circuit court of appeals may, iHt deems proper, certifytihe question of jurisdiction to this court." -And this it would do undersectibn 6 of act of 1891, which gives this ,of law ,to the supreme court, concourt the power to certify cerning. which it desires for its decisiQn. We do not think it necessary to certif)' 80 plain a question 88 the Jurisdiction of the circuit court in thisdlSe to thesupremecourt'for instructitms. The plaintiff in error might haLve taken the case. to the supreme court on that question, instead of to this court upon the whole case. The judgtnent()f the court below is affirmed. )(oKBNNA,
Circuit Judge.
I concur in the judglnent.
/. , . . .. CCWwU Vourt, J1J. D., rp:aa. M$roh Term, 1880.)
LGUN1sirMBN'i'-EQuITABLBDBl'BN'SBs-'rBusT PROPBRTT.
When a corporatloa Is .18"ed,_ garnishee, under Bess. Laws Tex. 1875, P. 102, in respect to shares of its stock held by a judgment debtor, it may set up as a defense that'tllestoelt is'held by the lattsr as a trustee merely, and Is not subject . to sale,for:his debts, notwithstanding that such .defense is equitable In its 118ture. The property of the city of GalvestOn in its water front was held fortbe beDeftt of. 'the publio, and ,was not &lienable without the consent 'of the legislature, IlO.1' subject to be.taken under process for the olty's 'The sale by the cittof its property ill the water front to the Galveston Wharf in consideration of cortain shares of .tock iDsucb companJ', derived all its validity from the act of tbe state legislature, dated, June :l3, 1810; and as that act declared 'that the stock should be beld in trust for the hihabitant8 of the city, .and DOt subject .1;(1 .8llsignment, pledge, or mortgage, "or any liability for debt whatev.er," except by OODsent of four fifths of the qualified voter&, the stook is not subject tosaIo, under process of aarnishment, t.o satisf1 · again,at the oiljJ. .
.. It:1i/NIOIP.u,CORPOR4'J'IONs-PUULIO PBOPEB'lY-LuBILITYJOOR DUBTS.
.... li!J.ME-STOClt IN COBPOIUTIONSo
,
, ftDERAL REPORTER, 'vdl.
50. '
4, SAME-DIvIblnms. The trust attaches to dividends upon the stock as well as the stock itself, and they, too, are exempt from sale for the city's debts.
At Law. Proceeding in· garnishment brought by D. G. Hitchcock & Co. against the Galveston Wharf Gompany to subject certain shares of its stock held by the city of Galveston to pay a judgment against the city. Decree of sequestration refused. The second and third sections of an act of the legislature of Texas entitled" An act to provide for the sale of the shares in any joint-stock or incorporated company on execution," approved March 13, 1875, 1875, p. ·102,) providedctMt-'"In any case where the plaintiff hils. recovered a final judgment against the defen'danli,and the same is unsatisfied, if the plaintiff, his agf;!nt or attorney, shoulddUe an affidavit in the court where sucb was obtained. to the effect that such jUdgment is unsatisfied either in whole or in part, and that is the owner'of shares in the capital stock of any joint-stock or incorpo.rated company in this state, and that he knuws of no other or a sufof property out of which said jndgment be made, the couttin which Such judgment is pending should a writ of garnishment against stich corpol'ation. III .. ... If, on the ing in of the answer of any such joint-stock or incorporated company, it should appear that the defendant is the owner of any shares in such company or corpplJl,liWIl, '" "'. '" the court should. order and decree a sale of a sufficient portion of the shares of such company, describing them, in such judgment, ¥,sl:iaH be to pay the d«;l.bt of the plaintiff, and aU costs of suit .. " . On May 9;1879, the plaintiffs recove'red, in this court a judgment against the city of Galveston for $117,550. On June 9,1879, an exe· on jtldgmeUh ,!l-nd on same day returned cution was unsatisfied, and said judgment still remains unsatisfied. On the same day Hitchcock & Co. filed in this court a petition, verified by affidavit, in which the foregoing facts wererecited,lH1d in which it was alleged that the judgment debtor, the city of Galveston, was the owner of shares in the corporate stockoft,he. Wh.arf C()mpany, . company incorporated by the laws of Texas, and residing arid doing business in said city of Galveston, and re!1lizing and its stockholdthat there was no other suffiers, including the city of cient property belonging to the jUd,gll1ent debtor out of which,the judgment aforesaid could be made. Thereupon the plaintiffs prayed for a writ of against the Wharf Company, requiring it to answer what number of'shares of its capital stock was owned by the city of Galveston, and value thereof; and also what were its bilities to the city of Galveston; and also what effects of said city it had in its possession, and what credits and effects of said city there wero in the handl) of any other, person, to the best of its knowledge and belief; and that at its next term this court would order a sale of said shares of stock, that the proceeds thereof might be applied to the payment of said judgment. On the same day (June 9, 1879) a writ of garnishment was issued, and on the next day served On the Galveston Wharf Company. The whilIf company, on November 6, 1879, filed pleas to the jurisdic-
HITOHCOCK
v.
GALVESTON WnARF CO.
265
tion, demurrers, and an answer to the writ of garnishment, and the fidavit on which it was based. The answer set forth that at the date of the service of the writ or garnishment the city of Galveston was the owner ,of 6,222 shares of the capital stock of the wharf company, for which it held a certificate dated March 1. 1869, each share being for the sum of $100. TIJat the dation and nature of the right and title of the city to said stock was as follows: The property of said wharf company consisted of lands upon the Bay of Galveston, constituting the water front of the city, and extending to the channel, and covering the extension of the streets of the city of said channel portion, and extending from east to west in front of the city from Tenth to Forty-First streets, inclusive, and of wharves built over said hmds arid a portion of said streets to the channel of the bay and harbor, and in the franchise of collecting tolls and wharfage. That prior tl) March 1, 1879, the city oWDed no right or interest in said wharf company ,but claimed right ,to the said water front by reason of a public dedication thereof, and by, virtue of an act of the legislature of Texas,December 8, 1851, which authorized it to open to the harbor or chimnel' of the bay all its streets running north arid south, and 'w erect wharves at the ellcls Qf said streets, !lnd charge wharfage; and (sec, tioD 3Ytofill up such portions of the water front, lying between ordinary low-tide watermark and the channel on the bay side; as the city might deem necessary for public purposes; and by said act (section 4) the state relinquished to the city all the rights and privileges above mentioned; provided that nothing in the said third and fourth sections should be construed to affect any legal title to wharf privileges held by any sons in said city. That litigatiolJ arose between the city and certain claimants of wharf property and privileges, which resulted in a decision, reported in 23 Tex. 349-410, inclusive. That said litigation was 'lived in 1866, by a new suit commenced by the city of Galveston against the Galveston Wharf Company (which had in the mean been organized) and a nUInber of other claimants to wharf property, '1'hat said suit was finally, on April 1, 1869, compromised and settled between the city and wharf company, which compromise and settlement was embodied in a consent decree made by the court, as follows: "The Mayor, Aldermen, and Inhabitants of the City of Galvest<in v. The Galveston Wharf Company. This day the above cause came on to be heard; and leave is granted to both parties to amend their pleadings, and were filed; and thereupon the parties announced themselves ready fortrial; and waived a jury, and submitted this cause to the court; and further announced that the said parties, plaintiff <In,l defendant, had agreed upon the terms of a fiual settlement and compromise betwpen ,said parties, l\nd that the same should be entered as the decree and judgment of tile court herein, all errors and exceptions ther!Jto being wai ved; and the terms of said jUdgment and decree appearing to the court to be reasonable and fair. and for the public interests involved: Therefore it is considered, ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court that the present capital stock of the Galveston Wharf Company, consisting of twelve thousand four hundred and forty-four shares of stock, of $100 pel' share, amoullting in the aggregate to $1,244,400, shall be increased fill! one .balf thereof, viz., by six tbousand two hundred and twenty-two
266 pf$100 ('aeh, to I\um of $622, 200, sald stock, of saldsum of $622,200, shall be the property of the mayor, aldermen, and inhabitants of the city of Galveston, and the same shall. stand and remain on said company as the property of said mayor, aldermen, and inthe the city and the equal, undivided one third of the ,prQPertly of said company to: be and :vested ill it by this decree "f:lhtlU o:w.Ile.d .. and represented by its said stock; and the said the rights therein, and in said property of said mayor, citizens of city of Galveston, shall. be in trust for the presentatlU future inhabitants of the city of Galveston, and all and every part thereof: shall be inalienable, and not subject to conveyance, assignment, transfer, pledge, mortgage,: 'Bny liability for debt whatever, or in any other mannel' than by a vote offonr' fifths of all the qualified :voters of said city in favor of s()me clear and specific The dividends and net earnshall be I;'egularly paid to said may()r, aldermen, aud inhabings of of the city of Ga1vellton, to be disbursed and expended for the public of said present and fllture inhabitants of said city; and that the saidtplaintliffsshall be reIll'esented by three directors in the board of directors, ofsatdcompany, one,of whom shallibe the mayor Of said city, whQ shall be one oObe !lolnruittee on finance, another shall be an alderman of said city, and the th_fd shall e,ther be an citizen of said city, both to be elected bytt\e conncU.of S,aid.city; the other six directors of .said company tobeelectedby the remafningstockholdersof said company, of the stockohaid city·. And it is further expressly understood an!! agreed between the. parties, and is so ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that, In all the stockholders''meetings of said company, no measure shall be adoptfed, and no vote, act,. Or shall be valid, unless by a vote of three fourths of all the stockof,siUd l,loJPpany, exclusive of the said stock of tbe In considof all which it is.. between the parUes, and is now considered, ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the court, that all the property, rightS;' and claims, of eveI'y kind and description, (except certain lots and property herehiafter: specified,) of the said Galveston Wharf Company, and alsoa1l ,the right, title. interest, and claim, of every kind and description whatsoever, Of the said mayor, aldermen, and'inhabitants of the ci ty of Galveston, in and to aU the land and ground extending from. the shore or ordinary highwater mark oithe of Galveston, to the channel' of the bay or harbor, from .and including the '.street known on the map or plan of the said city of Galveston as · Ninth Street: on the east, to and inclnding the street known as · ThirtY"FirstStreet,'on the west, including all the ground known as the ·Flats' within saId limits, and also aUri ghts, capacity, powers, and claims of said plaintiffs to buUdanderect wharves, and take and receive wharfage therefor, at the end of p.ow or hereafter running Or extending to said are hereby, vested in the said Galvellton Consolichannel, be, and dated Wharf Company, and to be hencefprth the corporate pr.operty, right, and title of the Galveston Wharf Company, and owned, beld, possessed, .controlled, and administered by said company j all the united and consolidated prop'erty, rights, peing represented by said aggregate of $1,866,000, the .origipal two thirds thereof held by the present stockholders, and one third by the sa.id plaintiff, in trust as aforesilid. "
or
The answedutther alleged tlianhis decree was afterwards ratified and confirmed by an act of the legislature of']:'tixas of date June 23, 1870, as follows: . "An act to confirm the and settlements between the corporation of the city. of Galveston, tJle.Gah,eston City Company, the Houston & Gal ;Press Qompany,: _n(1, ,the Galveston Wharf Company.
HITCHCOCK ".GAtYVSTON WHARF CO.
267
Whereas,on the 8th day of December, 1851, an act was pa9sed by the legislatlne entitled'An act granting certain. PQwers to the corporation of Galveston city,' and on the 16th day of February. H!52, &Ilact was passed entitled 'An act supplementary to an act granting certain p()wers to the corporation of Galveston city,' approved December 1;, 1851; and whereas, litigation in regard to the property known as the' Flats,' within the corporate limits of said city, existed for many years, rettmHng the improvement and prosperity of said city, which sRid litigation was compromised and settled by a cOllsent decree. rendered in the district court of Brazoria county on the first day of April. 1869. in a suit wherein the said corporation of the city of Galveston was plaintiff, and the Wharf company was dpfendant, and by a further consent decree, rendered III said district court on the 2d day of November. 11;69. in a suit wherein the Galveston City Company was plaintiff. and the corporation of the city of Galveston was defendant, and by a sale by the Houston and Galveston Wharf and Pl'ess Company to the said Galveston Wharf Company: 'fherefore be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Texas that the said compromises and settlemen s between said parties. and the said decrees of the district court of Brazoria county, recited in the prpamble hereto. are in all respects validated. ratified, and confirmed: prOVided, that this act shal1llot be construed to affect the rigbt of claim of any person Whatever, not a party to said suits, decrees, I or comlJromises. Approved June 23, 1870." The answer further alleged that the said city had obtained said shares of stock, and now held the same by virtue of said compromise decree so confirmed by the act of the legislature; that since the service of the writ of garnishment dividends had been declared by the wharf company on its capital stock, and that the dividends on the stock of the city amounted to the sum of $4,170.50, which, on account of the service of said writ, it still held, and had declined to pay over to the city; that at the date of the service of the writ of garnishment the wharf company was indebted to the city in no otlier sum or manner, and had in its possession no other property of said city, and had no knowledge .or belief as to any credits or elfects of the city in the possession of any other person. And the wharf company claimed, being expressly notified and required by the city to do so, that said shares of stock of the city in the Galveston Wharf Company, and the dividends arising therefrom, were not subject to the proccss of garnishment. And the wharf company, on its own behalf, claimed that to subject said shares to forced sale, or tranl'lfer to private individunls for the debt of the city, would violate the contract under which alone the wharf company consented to the issue of said stock to the city, and the rights and interests of the wharf companyand the public in the premises. and the law and public policy of the state. The answer further alleged that the judgment of the said Hitchcock & Co. against the city of Galveston was founded on a contract made on February 28, 1874, and not at any anterior date; and thereupon the wharf company prayed to be dismissed, with its reasonable costs and attorneys' fees. To this, answer Hitchcock & Co. filed a. motion to strike out such parts thereof as setup that the stock owned by the city in the wharf company, and the dividends arising therefrom, were exempt from liabilities for its debts, and that a sale thereof would be in violation of the
2,68:
FlilDJl1RALREPOR'l'ER., . vol.
50.
under which the said' shares were issued, on the ground that these were allegations of equitable defenses to the writ of garnislitnent;of which this; as a court i)f Taw, could not take cognizance. Hitchcock & Co. also filed exceptions to the answer on the ground that, notwithstanding the averments of the same, the stock of the city and the wharf company, and the dividends accruing therefrom, were subject to the process of garnishment, and should be applied to the payment of their said judgment. P. Clta1'les Hume, for plaintiffs. W. P. B(tUinger, for City of Galveston. WOODS, Circuit Judge. The contention of the plaintiffs, that this court has no jurisdiction, of the matter set out in the answer of the garnishee, because they present equitahle defenses to the garnishment, and can therefore be considered only bjT a court ofequity, will not hold. By the act of 1875, (Sess. 1\:cts 1875, p. 102,) if, on the coming in of tbe answerof an incorporated company served as garnishee, it appears that the judgment debtor is the owner of any shares in such company, the court should order and decree a sufficient number of shares in such Qompany, describing them in such judgment, as shall be sufficient to pay thiedebt of the plaintiff, to be sold. By this enactment it is made the duty of the court to consider whether the answer denies the fact that the judgment debtor is the owner of the stock, and, upon the review of that question, the court is authorized to make, or refuse to make, a deor judgment directing the sale. The court is called upon to act upon the averments of this answer of the garnishee. If it appears that the judgment debtor has no stock in the company garnished, no sale will, of course, be ordered. If it appears that he is merely a nominal, but not .real, owner of the stock, no sale will be ordered. If he holds as a trustee,',the ownership being in another party, no sale will be ordered. To suppose that the court would order a sale of property not subject to execution; or to which a sale could confer no title, would be to attribute to the court the making of a vain and fruitless order. When a garnishee al}swers a writ of garnishment, it is his duty to state, with accuracy and dir,ectness, .all Jacts that lllay be necessary to enable the court to decide intelligently the qUllstion of his liability. Drake, Attachm. § 629. To require aoanswer, and then disregard it because the garnishee showed that while h,e was apparetltly,he was not equitably, indebted, and to.rend\:lI; a ju<;lgmept against him on 8uchapparent liability, and thereby hlIll to go into a court of equity for relief, would be to do a vain apd absurd thing. No court of law is bound to any such course. They and habitually exercise control over their process so as to prevent W1'P[ig and oppression. Suppose that the answer of the garnishee declared that the city of Galveston held stock in the wharf com'pany as h;t]stee for an orphan' asylum situate within its limits, would the court order a sale of the stock on the ground that the city held the legal title, and compel the trustee to go into equity to restrain sale? If the conteptipn 9f the. plaintiffs is right, that is what it would be the duty
ffiTCHCOCK fl., GALVE'lTONWHARF CO.
269
of the Murtto do in such case. The true rule is that if the answer of the garnishee discloses that the property in his possession is not subject to levy, or if it is held by the juogment debtor as a trustee, to refuse the order of sale; and, if the judgment creditor believes that his debtor has an equitable interest in the property, it is his place to file his bill in equity to render it subject to the payment of his debts. No court of law will order a sale of what is not subject to execution. That this stock of the city of Galveston in the wharf company is not subject to execution is, in substance, what is set up in the answer of the garnishee. We believe that this court, as a court of law, ought to consider this objection to an order of sale, and, if made out by the proof, to refuse the order. The motion to strike out such parts of the answer as set up the facts, which, it is claimed, show that the stock of the city in the wharf pany is not subject to be sold to pay the debts of the city, because such defense is of an equitable nature. must be overruled; We are next to consider whether,uponthe facts set up in the answer of the garnishee, the court should order a sale of the shares held by the city in the stock of the wharf company. On the one hand, it is claimed shows that the city holds the stock as a trustee for the b"neJ:H of the present and future inhabitants of the city, and that it not, therefore, be seized and sold, and that the very terms by which it holds the stock exempts it from seizure and sale to pay the city's debts. On the other hand, it is claimed that this stock is held by the city just as it holds any other municipal property, and not otherwise; that the trust is not for any specific purpose; that it is held for profit; and that it is not necessary to carryon the city government; and therefore it is liable for the city's debts. Property held by a trustee is not liable for his debts, and cannot be taken in execution upon judgment against him personally. It is not every legal interest that is made liable to a sale of afierijacia8. The debtor must have a personal interest in the property. Le88ee,oj Smith v. McCann, 24 How. 398. The question is therefore presented: Does the city of Galveston hold this stock in the wharf company by such a trust that it is exempt from execution and sale for the debts of the city? The source of the city's title to the stock is fully set out in the answer of the garnishee. The city claimed the water front abutting on the harbor. It claimed the right to extend its north and south streets to the channel of the harbor, and to erect wharves at the harbor ends of the streets, and to charge wharfage, by virtue of an act of the legislature of Texas. The title of the city to this part of the water front was sustained by the decree of the supreme court of the state, referred to in the answer. The city also claimed, by the dedication of the original proprietors, those portions of the water front lying between the streets terminating at the harbor. Now, it is clearly settled that whatever property the city had in the water front it held for the benefit of the public, and that it was not lia.. ble for the city's debts; Klein v. New Orleans, 99 U. S. 149. And such property could:not be alienated by the city,any more than its streets and save by consent ofthe legislature. Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, undertook, by the adjustment and
270
FEDl!lBAIi'BJ!:PORTER,
voL 50.'.; \;
between it and. other claifuants,. :wMoh was embraced; in a ,consent decree referred.to iIi a private corporation its title to the water front ofthecity,it undertook to do whatl'equired the legislative sanction to givec:it validity. !nour judgment; the.adjustment and compr'omisederivesall its vitality' from the ratifying act of :the legislature, a'll.d the case stands precisely as if,beforethe making Of the adjustment and compromise, the legislature had authorized it to be made upon the terms and conditions embraced therein. It was competent for the legislature, in Ruthorizingthe sale of the title of the city, to the water front, to prescribe the conditions of the Bale, and to direct what disposition should'.be made by the city of the consideration received for the propertysold. This the legislature, by the confirmatory act, has undertaken to' do. It has said thnt the city shall hold the proceeds of the property "intrust, for the present and future inhabitants of the city of Galveston, and all and every part thereof shall be inalienable, and not subject to;oonveyance, assignment, transfer,.pledge, mortgage, or any liability ·for ddht.whatever, in any other manner than by the vote of four fifths of all the. qualified voters in favor, of some clear and specific proposition therefor." These very limitatiolls appear written on the face of the stock by the wbarf company to the city. The city, by the auth01lity""hich permitted a sale of ,the water front, which was itself trustLptoperty, inalienable except, by legislative consent, and not liable to 'betakenin execution, is made a trustee of the proceeds of the sale, not tor the benefit of the municipal qorporation known as the "City of Galveston," but of the present and future inhabitants of the city. Those proceeds.,are decreed,by the legislature inalienable, except upon the vote of four filtha of the qualified citizens, and not to be at all liable tor the debts of the city ofGalveston. The plaintiflsin t.hiscause propose to sell this property for a debt of tr.ustee, and to convey it to the purchaE'-er at a forced sale, without first obtaining the consent of the court thereto. In other words, they propose to disregard the law of the state by virtue of which the city of Galveston holds title to this property. To us it appears the city of Galveston holds the stock.in the wharf company as a trustee for the present and {utureinhabitants of Galveston. It cannot, therefore, be sold for the :debts of the trustee. The legislature of the state has said that the stock shall not be liable for the debts of the city. By what authority can; this or any other court say that it &hall? The seizure and sale of this stock would also be in violation of the rights of the wharf company, assured bythecompromis6 and adjustment. and which have been recogllizedandconfirmed by the act of the legislature. This stock was city by the wharf company with the reservati\Jnsset out in the compromise. These reservations have been adopted by the legislature. To allow:asale of the stock, in defiance of the terms of the compromise,would o\'erride rights and privileges conferred on the wharf company by .the ,confirmatory act of the legislature. '1'0 sum up my views on the merits of the case: The title of the city of Galveston to thE' water front was held by the city as a trustee for the public. ,Hart.v.' Bu.rnett, 15 Cal. 531. That il?-alienable, save
UNITED
STATES
71. GE;;E:LIJ1!I1
271
and the property was not liabM to execu'Hon and sale for the debts of the city. By the comprom.ise the city and the wharf company, and the confirmatory act bf the legislature, a sale of this property so'held'by the city fol'! public use to a private corporation Was authorized and confirmed. The legislature, by the same act, 'directed thattheproceeds oft.besllle should be held by the city on the same trust, substantially, as the property sold, namely, for the use of the present and future inhabitants of the city of Galveston, and should not beliable for its debts. In my judgment, the city holds as a trustee, and for that reason the trust property cannot be sold for its debts. The legislature has, in effect, said that it should not be sold for the city's debts, and this is another reason why it cannot be sold on execution against the city. The same reasoning applies to the dividends declared upon the stock. They are not the property of the city, nor liable for its debts. ,The city. isa trustee of the dividends, as of the stock itself. It ,would ,be a futile thing for the legislature to say that the stock should not ,be :}iablefor the debts of the city, if aHits fruits and profits could be seized as'they accrued, and subjected to the payment of the city's debts. It seems, therefore, to be the dlity of the court to refuse any decree or judgJ;Deot directing the sale oOhis or a of its dividends; ami it is so ordered. , :· '
hy conseht CJt the legislature,
UNITED STATES
'U.
GEE LEB.
(Otf'cuUCO'Urt of Appeal8, Ninth Circuit. April 18, 1892.)
This act bl!oving been passed' I[lubject to the ratification of a treaty then Panding , between 'the -United States and the emperor of China, which was never ratified, 18 -not infoI'ce, except'section 13, thereof. . ..: " APPEAL TO THE DISTRIC'l: JUDGE.
2.
. ,:I'1Ie phrase "distriptjudge of the district, in section 18 of act of September 18,1888, construed, and held as the equivalent of the court of the district, " and a writ of error will lie from thIs court to the judgment thereof.' ' ,
·
a'CHINESE Mil:RC1UNT.·
A Cliinesemerchant domiciled In the United States, on his return thereto from a tempoI'ary absence therefrom, Is.not required to produClilthe certificate provided for in the act Of .July 5, 1884, in the case of persons1lrst comUii' into the U,D1ted States. ' . 48 Fed. Rep. 825, am.rmed. ' (Synabus' by the Oourt.)
Error to the District Court of Washington. At Law. Patrick H. Winston, for plaintiff in error. Charles L. Weller, (Wm. H. White, of counsel,) for defendant in 'Before,'GILBERT, Circuit Judge, and DEADY and HAWLEY, District Judges.' . DEADY, District Jp:dge. On October 7, 1891, Gee Lee,aliaa Lee Hoy, was arrested and brought before a commissioner of the circuit court ()f