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50 Ga. 208

Sharp v. Kennedy

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided July 15, 1873

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1873-07-15

Illegality. Amendment. Before Judge Steozer. Terrell Superior Court. May Term, 1873. An execution issued in favor of Wright Kennedy against Leroy Brown, David Sharp, security, and Farnum & Sharp, returnable to the May term, 1873, of Terrell Superior Court, for $800 00, principal, besides interest and cost.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1873-07-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently October 1962

8 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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McCay, Judge.

¶11. We see no error in this judgment. The entry of the sheriff was a perfect entry. The Code does ’not require, in terms, that it should be signed, though that is undoubtedly proper: Code (Irwin’s) 3592. But the failure to sign is, as we think, amendable. The entry describing the property, and asserting the intention of the officer to seize the land, was complete. The signature is only the supplying of a clerical error. It might be different if there was no entry, (in case of land,) or if the entry was, in itself, wholly wanting in certainty: See case of Wilson vs. Ansley, at this term.

¶22. We think the affidavit was entirely too indefinite. It was not possible for the plaintiff to take issue on it. Admitting that the question intended to be made, can be made in this way — though this is by no means clear — still, it does not appear, by the affidavit, what it was that plaintiff refused to turn over. Nor does it appear that he was not justified in the refusal. It is stated, it is true, that he had a certain deed as collateral security, but it does not appear what deed. Nor would it be possible for a jury to find on the issue tendered one way or another, as to this deed, because there is not the least indication what the deed was. If parties propose to seek their equitable rights at law, they must set them forth at law as they -would be required to do in equity.

¶3As this affidavit is dismissed for want of certainty, the defendant loses no rights, except that he loses this mode of redress.

¶4Judgment affirmed.

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