50 SW3D 173 - Murphy v. Commonwealth

STUMBO, J.,

¶1concurs, in part, however, dissents from the majority opinion as to the admissibility of Sprowls’ statement and the decision to overrule Peyton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 931 S.W.2d 451 (1996).

KELLER, J., concurs in a separate opinion in which JOHNSTONE, J., joins and STUMBO, J., joins as to the significance of KRS 610.200.*187WINTERSHEIMER, J.,

¶2concurs with the affirmation of the convictions of Sprowls and Weathers but respectfully dissents from the reversal of the Murphy conviction because he disagrees with the Bruton analysis found in the opinion.

KELLER, Justice,

¶3concurring.

¶4Although I agree with the majority’s conclusions, I write separately to clarify my interpretation of the significance of KRS 610.200 and to express my opinion that in a case where a juvenile defendant properly challenges the voluntariness of his or her confession, trial courts should consider an investigating officer’s failure to comply with KRS 610.200 as evidence relevant to the voluntariness inquiry.

¶5I agree with the majority that a police officer’s violation of the parental notification provisions of KRS 610.200 does not require a court to automatically suppress a juvenile defendant’s incriminating statements. I must emphasize, however, that these provisions are mandatory requirements1 which are inherently intertwined with questions concerning the voluntariness of a juvenile’s incriminating statements. This Court should not render those provisions moot by allowing officers to ignore them with impunity. Accordingly, I believe trial courts should consider police authorities’ compliance with the provisions of KRS 610.200 as an important variable in determining whether a juvenile’s confession was given voluntarily.

¶6In In re Gault,2the United States Supreme Court emphasized “that admissions and confessions of juveniles require special caution”3 because “authoritative opinion has cast formidable doubt upon the reliability and trustworthiness of ‘confessions’ by children.” 4 In accordance with its concerns, the Gault Court concluded “the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or adolescent fantasy, fright, or despair.”5

¶7The Kentucky General Assembly itself has recognized that juveniles accused with crimes are different from their adult counterparts and has demonstrated concern for “the protection of the rights of accused juveniles when they come in contact with our law enforcement agencies”6 by adopting measures, such as KRS 610.200, to protect juveniles who have been accused of crimes. In my opinion, the courts of the Commonwealth should examine voluntariness issues relating to juvenile defendants with an eye towards protective measures such as KRS 610.200 and the policy judg*188ments upon which such measures are based.

¶8JOHNSTONE, J., joins. Although dissenting from the majority’s result, STUMBO, J., joins as to the significance of KRS 610.200.

¶9.See Davidson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 613 S.W.2d 431 (1981):

The appellee argues that the statutory language of [KRS 61Ó.200] is directory rather than mandatory and that Officer Cissell substantially complied with the procedure. We cannot agree. The statute specifically states that "the officer shall immediately notify" the parent or guardian of the details of the arrest. The fact that the legislature when into such detail in prescribing the steps that should be taken in detaining a juvenile mitigates against the directory argument.

¶10Id.

¶11. 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967).

¶12. Id.at 387 U.S. at 45, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d at 556. See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948).

¶13. In re Gault, supra note 2 at 387 U.S. at 52, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d at 559-60.

¶14. Id.at 387 U.S. at 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d at 561.

¶15. Davidson v. Commonwealth, supranote 1 at 431.