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← 50 Va. App. 72 - Burrell v. Commonwealth

50 Va. App. 72 - Burrell v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis

2007

Citation profile

6
cited by 6 later decisions
1
states following
August 2013
most recently cited

6 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Jackson v. Virginia · Barr v. Town & Country Properties, Inc. · 41 Va. App. 250 - Kelly v. Commonwealth · 25 Va. App. 215 - Redman v. Commonwealth · 41 Va. App. 658 - Crowder v. Commonwealth

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 6 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “When considering on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence presented below, we “presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct” and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is “plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va.App. 96, 99 , 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002). Under this standard, “a reviewing court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Myers v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 113, 118 , 596 S.E.2d 536, 538 (2004) (emphasis in original) (quoting Crowder v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 658, 662-63 , 588 S.E.2d 384, 386-87 (2003)). It asks instead whether “ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41 Va.App. 250, 257 , 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). “ ‘This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’ ” Id. at 257-58, 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 ). Thus, we do not “substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact” even if our opinion were to differ. Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va.App. 375, 380 , 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. ““Intent to defraud” has been defined by this Court as acting “with an evil intent, or with the specific intent to deceive or trick.” Campbell v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.App. 988, 990 , 421 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1992) (en banc), aff'd in part, 246 Va. 174 , 431 S.E.2d 648 (1993). Intent “may, and often must, be inferred from the facts and circumstances in a particular case.” Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836 , 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979). We must “ ‘look to the conduct and representation of the defendant.’” Rader v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 325, 329 , 423 S.E.2d 207, 210 (1992) (quoting Norman v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.App. 518, 519 , 346 S.E.2d 44, 45 (1986)).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.