Small v. Britton’s Empirical Analysis
500 F.2d 299 · 1974
Citation profile
31 federal appellate · 4 district · 10 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 58 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2009 · most notably Moody v. Daggett (1976), Federal Deposit Insurance v. Canfield (1992)
31 federal appellate · 4 district · 10 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
Relationships
Relies on Morrissey v. Brewer · Byrne v. Karalexis · Cook v. United States Attorney General · Cooper v. Lockhart
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 58 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(Emphasis added). . . . 64 In summary, we conclude: (1) the Morrissey decision requires that a revocation hearing be held within a reasonable time after the parolee is taken into custody; (2) a parolee is not”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““A federal parolee is not taken into custody until after the parole revocation warrant has been executed. Accord, Cook v. United States Attorney General, 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1974). 18 U.S.C.A. § 4207 . provides that a parolee is entitled to a hearing only after he is ‘retaken upon a warrant.’ (Emphasis added.) If the wording of a provision of a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, its evident meaning must be accepted. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 45.02 (4th Ed. 1973.) “We recognize that there are decisions from other federal courts which support Small’s contention that a parolee is entitled to a revocation hearing (and the attendant opportunity to present ‘mitigating’ circumstances), within a reasonable time after an alleged parole violation even where the parole revocation warrant is based upon the commission of a crime for which the parolee has been convicted. Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F.Supp. 889 (D.D.C.1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F.Supp. 571 (D.D.C.1974); Sutherland v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 366 F.Supp. 270 (D.D.C.1973); Cf., Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973). Contrary to our interpretation and holding, these decisions stand for the proposition that it is the ‘issuance’ rather than the ‘execution’ of the revocation warrant which triggers the due process time limits for the revocation hearing set forth in Morrissey . We disagree. We find no such mandate in the Supreme Court’s decision.” 500 F.2d at 301, 302 .”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“while a revocation warrant must be executed within a reasonable time . . . incarceration in a state institution (is) . . . a good reason for delay in the execution of a warrant.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Jones v. Johnston
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.