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500 S.W.2d 117

Docket No. 47326.

Jorden v. State

Thomas Lee JORDEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

Decided October 17, 1973.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · decided 1973-10-17

Cited by 11 later decisions — most recently May 1981

11 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“"In addition to failing to inform the petitioner as to the possible penalties for burglary, the trial court, apparently overlooking the fact that the two pleas were being heard together and at the same time, did not adequately determine that the guilty plea to burglary was `uninfluenced by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon * * *.'"”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Bosworth v. State

“This court divided in Jorden with the majority concluding that the omission in the admonishment could not have misled him to his detriment. In a footnote the majority stated an accused cannot be assessed a penalty greater than”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Cameron v. State

Relies on Ex Parte Davis · Ex Parte Battenfield · 163 Tex. Crim. 53 - Alexander v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1973-10-17

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*118 Michael L. Morrow, Dallas, for appellant.

¶2Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Robert T. Baskett, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, and Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.

¶3

OPINION

¶4DOUGLAS, Judge.

¶5This is an appeal from a conviction for the offense of murder with malice. Trial was before the court on a plea of guilty and punishment was assessed at ten years.

¶6Appellant's sole contention is that he was not properly admonished by the trial court as to the consequences of his plea as required by Article 26.13, Vernon's Ann.C.C. P.

¶7The court admonished the appellant that the punishment for such offense is "... confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for not less than two years nor more than life ..."; whereas the statutory range under Article 1257, Vernon's Ann.P.C., is actually "... life or for any term of years not less than two." It is the omission of the words "for any term of years" which appellant contends is violative of Article 26.13, supra.

¶8The admonishment, even though it does not follow the exact wording of the statute, was sufficient to inform appellant that the consequences of his plea could include a sentence of any term in excess of two years. The omission in the admonishment could not have misled him to his detriment.[1] Valdez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 479 S.W.2d 927.

¶9No reversible error being shown, the judgment is affirmed.

¶10ONION, Presiding Judge (dissenting).

¶11The majority, which has already eroded[1] Article 26.13, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., now begins an attempt to completely undermine the entire heretofore mandatory statute.

¶12Article 26.13, supra, provides that:

"If the defendant pleads guilty, or enters a plea of nolo contendere he shall be admonished by the court of the consequences; and neither of such pleas shall be received unless it plainly appears that he is sane, and is uninfluenced by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon, prompting him to confess his guilt."

¶13This court has repeatedly held that the provisions of the statute are mandatory and the prerequisites therein set out must be complied with as a condition precedent to validity of a guilty plea, and the question of compliance may be raised at any time. See Ex parte Battenfield, 466 S.W. 2d 569 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).

¶14The "consequences of the plea," as used in the statute, have been interpreted as meaning the punishment provided by law for the offense and the punishment which could be inflicted under this plea. Alexander *119 v. State, 163 Tex.Cr.R. 53, 288 S.W.2d 779 (1956); Ex parte Battenfield, supra.

¶15Article 1257, Vernon's Ann.P.C., provides that punishment for murder with malice "shall be death or confinement in the penitentiary for life or for any term of years not less than two."

¶16In the instant case the court admonished the defendant, who was indicted for murder with malice, that "If you are found guilty, the law requires me to assess your punishment in the murder with malice case at confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for not less than two years nor more than life."

¶17Only recently in Loudd v. State, 474 S. W.2d 200 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), this court noted that the requirement that a court advise a defendant as to the proper range of punishment is mandatory and a failure to do so requires reversal.

¶18Further, it is clear that the statutory admonishment must be made manifest of record, and the admonishment cannot be supplied by inference, intendment or presumption. Ex parte Battenfield, supra.

¶19In Ex parte Davis, 412 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Cr.App.1967), it was held that a life sentence is not includable within a statute providing punishment "for any term of years without prescribing a maximum penalty." See also Ex parte Balas, 412 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.Cr.App.1967).

¶20The fact that a defendant should be properly admonished as to the range of punishment is most graphically pointed up by the punishment assessed in some recent cases. See, i.e., Yeager v. State, 482 S.W. 2d 637 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) (500 years); Sills v. State, 472 S.W.2d 119 (Tex.Cr. App.1971) (1,000 years).

¶21The admonishment as to the "consequences of the plea" was clearly in error. The majority admit it does not follow the statutory range of penalty, but hold the "omission in the admonishment could not have misled him to his detriment" without any reasoning being advanced.

¶22Now trial judges will be led to believe that all they have to say to a defendant pleading guilty is that the punishment applicable "is some time in the Department of Corrections," and the majority will affirm because he was sentenced to a term of years in such institution, and therefore he could not have been misled to his detriment.

¶23I vigorously dissent.

¶24ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissent.

NOTES

¶25[1] The dissent expresses concern that when this opinion was originally drafted no reasoning was advanced to show that the omission of "any term of years" from the admonishment could not have misled appellant to his detriment, apparenly because one accused of murder might receive five hundred or even a thousand years. If the dissenters will explain how an accused can be assessed a penalty greater than life in prison, further reasoning might be in order.

¶26[1] See i. e., Espinosa v. State, 493 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Mitchell v. State, 493 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973); Higginbotham v. State, 497 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Cr.App.1973).

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