501 So. 2d 19 - Herring v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““The failure to communicate to Herring that the test was compulsory carried with it, we think the implicit suggestion that the test was permissive and that he thus had a right to refuse. Consequently, even if the refusal had some arguable probative value, its admission would be unfair where the police may have led the Defendant to believe that he had a right to refuse.” 501 So.2d at 21 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Howitt v. State · State v. Holcomb

2. “[A] defendant who is told he may refuse and is told of no consequences which would attach to his refusal may quite plausibly refuse so as to disengage himself from further interaction "with the police or simply decide not to volunteer to do anything he is not compelled to do. In contrast, if a defendant knows that his refusal carries with it adverse consequences, the hypothesis that the refusal was an innocent act is far less plausible. Thus, in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the Court, holding admissible the defendant’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test, pointed out that, although the defendant was not told that the refusal could be used against him in court, he was told that he could lose his driver’s license if he refused. This latter warning made it “clear that refusing the test was not a ‘safe harbor,’ free of adverse consequences.” Id. at 566 , 103 S.Ct. at 924 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 760 . While the court in Neville held the refusal admissible because the defendant had good reason not to refuse, it noted, in comparison, that in United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 , 95 S.Ct. 2133 , 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975), the Court had prohibited the impeachment use of the defendant’s post-Mz-rawfe-warning silence because his “silence during police interrogation lacked significant probative value and ... any reference to his silence under such circumstances carried with it an intolerably prejudicial impact.” Id. at 180 , 95 S.Ct. at 2138 , 45 L.E”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Jason D. Allen v. State of Florida

3. “(l)(a) Any person who accepts the privilege extended by the laws of this state of operating a motor vehicle within this state shall, by so operating such vehicle, be deemed to have given his consent to submit to an approved chemical test or physical test including but not limited to an infrared light test of his breath for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood or breath, ... if he is lawfully arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the person was driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, chemical substances, or controlled substances. The chemical or physical breath test shall be incidental to a lawful arrest .... Such person shall be told that his failure to submit to any lawful test of his breath or urine, or both, will result in the suspension of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle for a period of 1 year.... The refusal to submit to a chemical or physical breath test or to a urine test upon tlte request of a law enforcement officer as provided in this section shall be admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding. (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Taylor v. State