Johnson v. Home State Bank’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

264 federal appellate · 137 district · 153 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 2,589 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.”

   144 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dewsnup v. Timm · Ricky Lawson and Nancy Lawson v. Bancboston Mortgage Corporation

2. “Congress has expressly prohibited various forms of serial filings. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109 (g) (no filings within 180 days of dismissal); § 727(a)(8) (no Chapter 7 filing within six years of a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 filing); § 727(a)(9) (limitation on Chapter 7 filing within six years of Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 filing). The absence of a like prohibition on serial filings of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions, combined with the evident care with which Congress fashioned these express prohibitions, convinces us that Congress did not intend categorically to foreclose the benefit of Chapter 13 reorganization to a debtor who previously has filed for Chapter 7 relief.”

   14 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Society National Bank v. Barrett · Branigan v. Bateman

3. “... [W]e must infer that Congress fully expected that an obligation enforceable only against a debtor’s property would be a “claim” under § 101(5) of the Code_ The legislative history surrounding § 102(2) directly corroborates this inference. The Committee Reports accompanying § 102(2) explain that this rule of construction contemplates, inter alia, “nonrecourse loan agreements where the creditor’s only rights are against property of the debtor, and not against the debtor personally.” H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 315; accord, S.Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 28, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5814, 6272. Insofar as the mortgage interest that passes through a Chapter 7 liquidation is enforceable only against the debtor’s property, this interest has the same properties as a nonrecourse loan. It is true, as the Court of Appeals noted, that the debtor and creditor in such a case did not conceive of their credit agreement as a nonrecourse loan when they entered it. [Citation omitted.] However, insofar as Congress did not expressly limit § 102(2) to nonrecourse loans but rather chose general language broad enough to encompass such obligations, we understand Congress’ intent to be that § 102(2) extend to all interests having the relevant attributes of nonre-course obligations regardless of how these interests come into existence.”

   12 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 680 Fifth Avenue Associates v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. in Rehabilitation (In Re 680 Fifth Avenue Associates) · In Re Buchferer