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← 502 F.3d 1215 - Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority

Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority’s Empirical Analysis

502 F.3d 1215 · 2007

Citation profile

56
cited by 56 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
June 2024
most recently cited

7 federal appellate · 19 district · 2 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 56 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2024 · most notably Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (2010)

7 federal appellate · 19 district · 2 state decisions

410200720102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 2000E (§ 703 of the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964)

Relies on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green · Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White · Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins · Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. · Kendrick v. Penske Transportation Services, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 56 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[Discrimination against a transsexual based on the person’s- status as a transsexual is not discrimination because of sex under Title VII. In reaching this eonclusion, this court recognizes it is the plain language of the statute and not the primary intent of Congress that guides our interpretation of Title VII.... [Tjhere is nothing in the [Congressional] record to support the conclusion that the plain meaning of “sex” encompasses anything more than male and female. In light of the traditional binary conception of sex, transsexuals may not claim protection under Title VII from discrimination based solely on their status as a transsexual.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits "discrimination] ... because of ... sex” in the "terms” or "conditions” of employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “At this stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, [defendants] do[] not need to litigate the merits of the reasoning, nor do[ ] [they] need to prove that the reason relied upon was bona fide, nor do[ ] [they] need to prove that the reasoning was applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Rather, [defendants] need only explain [their] actions against the plaintiff in terms that are not facially prohibited by Title VII.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.