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← 503 F.2d 607 - Turner v. Impala Motors

Turner v. Impala Motors’s Empirical Analysis

503 F.2d 607 · 1974

Citation profile

41
cited by 41 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
11
states following
September 2010
most recently cited

20 federal appellate · 3 district · 11 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 41 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently September 2010 · most notably Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. (1974), United States v. Coleman (1980)

20 federal appellate · 3 district · 11 state decisions — followed in 11 states

29019741980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. · Goldberg v. Kelly · Fuentes v. Shevin · Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority · Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “It is clear that in this case the state did not exert any control or compulsion over the creditor’s decision to repossess. The private activity was not commanded by the simply permissive statute. While mere existence of the statute might seem to suggest encouragement, we conclude that the effect of the statute is only to reduce a creditor’s risk in making repossessions. As a practical matter, a creditor’s decision is more likely to be principally influenced by the economics of the situation than by the presence of a permissive statute. We fail to see where the creditor has sought to invoke any state machinery to its aid. Rather, the creditor has simply relied upon the terms of its security agreement pursuant to the private right of contract. Assuming that the statute was non-existent, the remedy of self-help repossession could still be utilized based on its common law heritage and the private right to contract. We fail to see how the creditor is attempting to enforce any right in reliance upon a constitutional or statutory provision as in Reitman or is even asserting any state-created right. Rather, we see a creditor privately effectuating a right which was created in advance by contract between the parties. At best, the right is one that is merely codified, but not created, in the statute.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “We are likewise persuaded that Reitman cannot be relied upon to justify a finding of state action here_ [W]e view Reit-man as dealing with a state attempt to accomplish indirectly what it was prohibited from doing directly. We cannot ignore the fact that the context of onerous racial discrimination in which the case was set demanded special scrutiny. The injustices of racial discrimination cast a different shadow than that of the case now before us.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.