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503 So. 2d 371

503 So.2d 371

12 Fla.L.Weekly 498

Docket No. 86-897.

McCoy v. State

Kenneth McCOY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided February 12, 1987.

Rehearing Denied March 4, 1987.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1987-02-12

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“critical issue in a restraint case is the degree of prejudice caused by the restraints.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 698 So. 2d 1299 - Jackson v. State

Relies on Illinois v. Allen · Medlin v. Mann · Garrett v. United States

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1987-02-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently January 2013

7 state decisions

301987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Charles B. Tiffany, Kissimmee, for appellant.

¶2Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Margene A. Roper, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

¶3SHARP, Judge.

¶4McCoy appeals his conviction and sentence for manslaughter. The sole issue on appeal is whether the shackling of McCoy's ankles during his trial constituted reversible error. We affirm.

¶5At the opening of trial, defense counsel objected to McCoy's being required to wear leg restraints. McCoy was shackled pursuant to the Orange County Sheriff's policy that all persons charged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment must be shackled in circuit court as a security measure. The table where McCoy sat was draped and the jury was cleared from the courtroom when he was moved. The shackles were removed prior to his testifying before the jury. There was no showing in this case that the jury was aware of McCoy's shackling.

¶6The use of shackles to restrain a defendant at trial should rarely be employed as a security device. Illinois v. Allen,397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970), reh'g denied,398 U.S. 915, 90 S.Ct. 1684, 26 L.Ed.2d 80 (1970). "[R]estraints may confuse the defendant, impair his ability to confer with counsel, and significantly affect the trial strategy he chooses to follow." Zygadlo v. Wainwright,720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied,466 U.S. 941, 104 S.Ct. 1921, 80 L.Ed.2d 468 (1984). They should be used only when it is necessary to deter escape or prevent a disturbance or potential injury to people in the courtroom.

¶7A trial court should not simply defer to the security measures set forth by the sheriff. However, "[t]he critical issue in a restraint case is the degree of prejudice caused by the restraint." Elledge v. State,408 So.2d 1021, 1022-1023 (Fla. 1981); cert. denied,459 U.S. 981, 103 S.Ct. 316, 74 L.Ed.2d 293 (1982); reh'g denied,459 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 771, 74 L.Ed.2d 984 (1983). *372 In this case, McCoy was unable to demonstrate any impairment or detriment during his one-and-a-half day trial warranting reversal.

¶8AFFIRMED.

¶9DAUKSCH and COBB, JJ., concur.

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