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504 So. 2d 490

Docket Nos. 86-162, 86-743.

Buffington v. Torcise

Ray E. BUFFINGTON, Appellant, v. Steve TORCISE and South Dade Realty, Inc., a Florida Corporation, et al., Appellees.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided March 24, 1987.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1987-03-24

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“[a] defaulting party has a due process entitlement to notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the presentation and evaluation of evidence necessary to a judicial determination of the amount of [those] damages.”

quoted by 4 later decisions, including SEC. Bank v. Bellsouth Adv. & Pub. Corp., 855 So. 2d 665 - Boulos v. YUNG SHENG XIAMEN YONG CHEMICAL INDUSTRY CO.

“an arithmetical calculation or by application of definite rules of law”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 559 So. 2d 670 - Tand v. CFS Bakeries, Inc.

Relies on 443 So. 2d 944 - Mercer v. Raine · 432 So. 2d 660 - Bowman v. Kingsland Development, Inc. · 381 So. 2d 318 - B/G AMUSEMENTS, INC. v. Mystery Fun House

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1987-03-24

How this case has been cited

Cited by 12 later decisions — most recently June 2016

12 state decisions

501987199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1Joyce M. Siemon and Jay Rothlein, North Miami Beach, for appellant.

¶2Paul G. Fletcher, Homestead, and Giselle D. Lylen, Walton, Lantaff, Schroeder & Carson and Gregory J. Willis, Miami, for appellees.

¶3Before NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

¶4PER CURIAM.

¶5Buffington appeals from the trial court's order striking his complaint, dismissing his lis pendens, and entering a default against him on Torcise's counterclaims and from the entry of a default judgment for Torcise in the amount of $44,555.50. We find the appellant's contentions, as they relate to the entry of the court order, to be without *491 merit. Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Buffington's pleadings, Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.380(d); see Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944 (Fla. 1983); cf. Wallraff v. T.G.I. Fridays, Inc., 490 So.2d 50 (Fla. 1986) (trial court may impose discovery sanction without violation of direct court order), dismissing the lis pendens, see § 48.23(3), Fla. Stat. (1985), or in entering a default against Buffington, see Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.500, we affirm the order under review.

¶6We find merit, however, in Buffington's contention that the trial court erred in entering a final default judgment without holding a hearing to determine the actual damages Torcise suffered. Torcise, by the very nature of his claims, rejected the existence of a valid contract. Furthermore, though Buffington was deemed to have admitted all of the information in Torcise's requests for admission as a result of Buffington's failure to reply, see Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.370(a), those requests did not pertain to the validity of the contract. Finally, the trial court's order dismissing the lis pendens and its entry of a judgment for Torcise on his counterclaims was tantamount to a holding that the lease-option contract was invalid. Therefore, the trial court erred in awarding damages based upon the liquidated damage clause within that invalid contract.

¶7The amount of damages suffered by Torcise were not otherwise determinable based upon "an arithmetical calculation or by application of definite rules of law" and were, therefore, unliquidated. Bowman v. Kingsland Dev., Inc., 432 So.2d 660, 662 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). When a claim involves unliquidated damages "[a] defaulting party has a due process entitlement to notice and opportunity to be heard as to the presentation and evaluation of evidence necessary to a judicial determination of the amount of [those] damages." Bowman, 432 So.2d at 663; Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.440(c); see also L.B.T. Corp. v. Camacho, 429 So.2d 88 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); B/G Amusements, Inc. v. Mystery Fun House, Inc., 381 So.2d 318 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Consequently, the trial court erred in entering a final default judgment without first holding a hearing and allowing Buffington to present evidence on the issue of damages.

¶8Accordingly, we reverse the final default judgment and remand for a determination of actual damages[1]; in all other respects, we affirm.

NOTES

¶9[1] South Dade Realty, a third-party defendant to the action below, was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties. That dismissal has not been appealed and is unaffected by our decision.

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