United States v. Jamison’s Empirical Analysis
505 F.2d 407 · 1974
Citation profile
72 federal appellate · 11 district · 36 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 145 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2017 · most notably Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978), United States v. Dinitz (1976)
72 federal appellate · 11 district · 36 state decisions — followed in 15 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 5005
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Boykin v. Alabama · Johnson v. Zerbst · North Carolina v. Pearce · Fay v. Noia
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 145 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"Although free to reprosecute appellants after their first trial was aborted, the government was not necessarily free to reindict them for a more serious crime than had been originally charged. On the contrary, we have concluded that, under the line of Supreme Court cases which began in 1969 with North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 656 ] (1969), the reindictment of defendants for first degree murder, absent any showing of justification for the increase in the degree of the crime initially charged, denied them due process of law." 505 F.2d 407 at 418 . "For a time it was uncertain whether due process required that criminal defendants be shielded as well from the danger of prosecutorial vindictiveness, and specifically from increases in the offense charged. Chaffin suggested that prosecutorial vindictiveness was not to be feared, at least insofar as it might bring about an increased sentence through increased sentence recommendation. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra [ 412 U.S. 17 ], at 27 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 1977 [at 1983 n. 13, 36 LEd.2d 714]. However, lower courts have generally assumed in the wake of Pearce that it did apply to increases in the charged offense, Sefcheck v. Brewer, 301 F.Supp. 798 (S.D.Ilowa 1969) (Pearce prohibits charge increase after withdrawal of guilty plea), though it has on occasion been found either that there was no effective increase in the charged offense, United States v. Farinas, 308 F.Supp. 459 (S.D.N.Y.1969) (no pre”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““[A] charge increase might in some circumstances be justified by intervening events or by new evidence of which the government was excusably unaware at the time of the first indictment.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“Since this record is devoid of any illumination of the reasons why the first degree murder charge was brought, we can only conclude that the reindictment of appellants for first degree murder [after mistrial on an earlier indictment for second degree murder] denied them due process and that their convictions of that charge cannot stand.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.