Murphy v. Cockrell’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The teaching of [the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Bullock, Clements and Connick ] leads us to believe that if Murphy supported another candidate in the race for Montgomery County PVA other than Cockrell [her boss], such conduct would be protected by the First Amendment. In fact, if Murphy had simply actively campaigned against Cockrell, but had not become a candidate herself, her speech would be protected. Cockrell argues that the fact that Murphy was a candidate, and supported herself as such, is reason enough under Carver to justify Murphy’s termination. We decline to extend Carver in such a manner. Carver itself distinguished cases in which candidates had been singled out or treated differently based on their political viewpoints or expressions, noting that Carver was dismissed solely based on the fact of his [sic] candidacy, not his [sic] political views. We expressly recognized in Carver that while the mere fact of candidacy was not constitutionally protected, the expression of one’s political belief still fell under the ambit of the First Amendment. Accordingly, we now hold that the fact that Cockrell fired Murphy due to Murphy’s political speech during the course of her campaign — rather than the mere fact of Murphy’s candidacy — is enough to trigger protection under the First Amendment.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cook v. Popplewell

2. “Category One: positions specifically named in relevant federal, state, county, or municipal law to which discretionary authority with respect to the enforcement of that law or the carrying out of some other policy of political concern is granted; Category Two: positions to which a significant portion of the total discretionary authority available to category one position-holders has been delegated; or positions not named in law, possessing by virtue of the jurisdiction’s pattern or practice the same quantum or type of discretionary authority commonly held by category one positions in other jurisdictions; Category Three: confidential advisors who spend a significant portion of their time on the job advising category one or two position-holders on how to exercise their statutory or delegated policymaking authority, or other confidential em ployees who control the lines of communication to category one positions, category two position[s,] or confidential advisors; Category Four: positions that are part of a group of positions filled by balancing out political party representation, or that are filled by balancing out selections made by different governmental agents or bodies.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Newell v. Runnels

3. “I am not persuaded by [plaintiffs] argument that Carver can be distinguished because she was discharged not only for the fact of her candidacy but also for the manner in which she campaigned. As the district court aptly observed, this turns “on the question of whether attacking your opponent’s political experience is akin to an expression of political beliefs.” As I see it, saying “I am a better or more experienced candidate than my boss” is nothing more than the assertion of a rival candidacy. I believe that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn in this case is that [plaintiff] was discharged for her rival candidacy and not on account of her political beliefs or affiliations.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Greenwell v. Parsley