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← 506 F.2d 1158 - Olivas v. United States

Olivas v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

506 F.2d 1158 · 1974

Citation profile

30
cited by 30 later decisions
4
states following
November 2005
most recently cited

9 federal appellate · 1 district · 14 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently November 2005 · most notably Naton v. Bank of California (1981), Chevron Chemical Co. v. Superior Court (1982)

9 federal appellate · 1 district · 14 state decisions

1401974198019902000decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Federal Tort Claims Act)

Relies on Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman · Roberson v. United States · United States v. Price · State Ex Rel. Industrial Commission v. Pressley · Tucker v. Collar

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The Arizona courts have refused to draw such a distinction between “lien” and “subrogation” interests. “Lien rights” under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 23-1023’s predecessors have been treated as if they were subrogation rights. State Industrial Commission v. Pressley, 74 Ariz. 412 , 250 P.2d 992, 996-997 (1952); Hornback v. Industrial Commission, 106 Ariz. 216 , 474 P.2d 807, 810-811 (1970). * * * * * * Moreover, under the same practical reading which the Arizona courts have accorded to prior versions of § 23-1023, it is clear that the lien interest created under paragraph (C) is merely an alternative to the assignment of rights under paragraph (B). The provisions are designed to insure that an employee will not receive a double recovery and that the insurance carrier will be reimbursed by the third-party tortfeasor for compensation actually paid.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “C. If he [the employee or his dependents entitled to workers’ compensation] proceeds against such other person [a third party not in the same employ], compensation ... shall be paid ... and the insurance carrier or other person liable to pay the claim shall have a lien on the amount actually collectable from such other person to the extent of such compensation____ The amount actually collectable shall be the total recovery less the reasonable and necessary expenses, including attorneys’ fees, actually expended in securing such recovery.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[I]f a part of the pecuniary loss is paid for by an outside source [then] it is more just that the windfall should inure to the benefit of the injured party than that it should accrue to the tort feasor. This conclusion seems to be based on substantial justice.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.