United States v. Faruolo’s Empirical Analysis
506 F.2d 490 · 1974
Citation profile
53 federal appellate · 10 district · 22 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 117 later decisions — most recently March 2023 · most notably State v. Jones (1984), United States v. Vasquez (1980)
53 federal appellate · 10 district · 22 state decisions — followed in 17 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2 · 18 U.S.C. § 371
Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Johnson v. Zerbst · Schmerber v. State of California · Bumper v. North Carolina · Corallo v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 117 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]he well founded advice of a law enforcement agent that, absent a consent to search, a warrant can be obtained does not constitute coercion. There is an admission by the officer that he has no right to proceed unless the defendant consents. There was in fact, here, a fair and sensible appraisal of the realities facing the defendant. ... No person, even the most innocent, will welcome with glee and enthusiasm the search of his home by law enforcement agents. However, in view of all the circumstances which we have de-tañed, we are persuaded that after realizing the facts, including that he had the right not to consent, [defendant] decided freely and voluntarily to consent to the search.”
4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Were the slate clean, I would be inclined to reject a finding of voluntariness obtained in response to statements about the obtaining of a warrant that did not in some way affirmatively communicate the discretionary aspect of the warrant-issuing process. If a person is confronted with only the choice of permitting an immediate search without a warrant or waiting the brief interval necessary for a warrant to be obtained, he is misled into believing that the only variable in the choice is time, rather than the far more important variable of whether the warrant will be issued at all. If he consents because he has been led to believe that obtaining a warrant is a virtually automatic formality, then regardless of his apparent willingness to permit the search, he has responded to a situation as ‘instinct with coercion’ as the one in Bumper , where the officer gained entry not with the assurance that a warrant could be obtained, but with the statement that he had already obtained one.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Weaver v. State · State v. Kahoonei““ ‘First, the agent should be permitted to do no more than give his prediction. Even if he need not explain the discretionary aspect of issuing warrants, he surely should not be permitted to convey the idea that no discretion exists. Any intimation that the warrant will automatically be issued should be considered as coercive as the announcement of an invalid warrant in [Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 797, 88 S. Ct. 1788 (1968)]. Drawing the line at this point admittedly makes validity of consent turn in some instances on subtle shifts of wording by the agent. But words spoken in the process of obtaining consent to waiver of a constitutional right ought to be chosen with care. The officers are not proceeding in haste to make a split-second decision of their authority to apprehend a fleeing suspect. They face a situation that normally calls for the delay necessary to obtain a search warrant. If they are to forego this requirement, it should not be too much to ask that they take care not to confront the accused with a choice that totally obliterates the important protective function of the warrant-issuing process. The agent can always be on the safe side of the line by plainly indicating that he will apply for a warrant and believes one will be issued, but that the decision whether to issue the warrant rests with the judge or magistrate to whom the agent will apply.’ ” p. 646.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. State v. Kahoonei · State v. Brown
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.