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← 507 F.2d 100 - Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.

Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis

507 F.2d 100 · 1974

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
3
states following
October 1995
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently October 1995

6 federal appellate · 1 district · 4 state decisions

90197419801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Alford v. Major · Allstate Insurance Company v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Consolidated Systems, Inc., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee. Allstate Insurance Company, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc., Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant v. Consolidated Systems, Inc., Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee · Carolina Freight Carriers Corp. v. Pitt County Transportation Co. · Kellogg Company v. Sanitors, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “... we think it is clear from the indemnity contract that the parties intended that Ryder (indemnitee) should be reimbursed for all losses which it sustained resulting from its use of the equipment and while under its exclusive dominion and control. In unequivocal terms the contract provides that the equipment shall be in the ‘exclusive possession, control and use’ of the lessee and that the lessee assumes full responsibility in respect to the equipment ‘to the public.’ The lessor, on the other hand, agrees to carry acceptable Liability and Property Damage insurance and, ‘to reimburse and otherwise indemnify Lessee for any and all losses sustained by Lessee resulting from the use of the aforesaid equipment.’ Clearly this language is susceptible of no meaning other than that the lessor was to indemnify the lessee for all losses sustained by it and resulting from its operation and use of the equipment, whether caused by the lessee’s own acts of negligence or otherwise. 507 F.2d at 103 .”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “* * * * * * In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has stated that there is no rule of public policy prohibiting the indemnitee from contracting for indemnification on account of its own acts of negligence but that a contract will not be so construed unless it was clearly intended to have that effect. Kellogg v. Sanitors, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 472 (Tenn.1973). The court quoted with approval the following statement of the rule from 41 Am.Jur.2d, Indemnity, Sec. 13: A contract of indemnity purporting or claimed to relieve one from the consequences of his failure to exercise ordinary care must be strictly construed. Accordingly, it is frequently stated as the general rule that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from his own negligent acts unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, or unless no other meaning can be ascribed to it. Mere general, broad, and seemingly all inclusive language in the indemnifying agreement has been said not to be sufficient to impose liability for the indemnitee’s own negligence. (Emphasis supplied by Tennessee court). 496 S.W.2d at 474 . ¡fc ifc * * * Sl!”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “It is agreed that Lessor [Mustang and Crowder] will carry acceptable Public Liability and Property Damage Insurance. Lessor [Mustang and Crowder] agrees to reimburse and otherwise indemnify Lessee [Ryder] for any and all losses sustained by Lessee [Ryder] resulting from the use of the aforesaid equipment.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.