Polite v. Diehl’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

57 federal appellate · 10 district · 4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 125 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “the limitation ... which would be applicable in the courts of the state in which the federal court is sitting had an action seeking similar relief been brought under state law.”

   9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Garcia v. Wilson · Celeste R. Deary, in No. 83-3408 v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, John Doe, Richard Roe & Jone Snow Department of Public Safety, F.B.I. Agent Ray Patton, & Govt. Of the V.I., Celeste R. Deary, in No. 83-3408 v. United States of America. Celeste R. Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, John Doe, Richard Roe & Jone Snow Department of Public Safety, F.B.I. Agent Ray Patton, & Govt. Of the V.I. Appeal of Government of the Virgin Islands, in 83-3409

2. ““Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Zeller v. Donegal School District Board of Education · Pennsylvania v. Porter

3. ““In determining which period of limitation to apply to an action under a particular federal statute, the federal court accepts the state’s interpretation of its own statutes of limitations, but determines for itself the nature of the right conferred by the federal statute. “The California courts have held that an action is based ‘upon a liability created by statute,’ within the meaning of Section 338(1), if the liability would not exist but for statute. Or, conversely, an action is not based ‘upon a liability created by statute’ if the right is one which would exist at common law in the absence of statute. Though broadly stated, the distinction drawn is sufficiently discriminating for the present case. “Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act clearly creates rights and imposes obligations different from any which would exist at common law in the absence of statute. A given state of facts may of course give rise to a cause of action in common-law tort as well as to a cause of action under Section 1983, but the elements of the two are not the same. The elements of an action under Section 1983 are (1) the denial under color of state law (2) of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Neither of these elements would be required to make out a cause of action in common-law tort; both might be present without creating common-law tort liability. As Mr. Justice Harlan recently suggested, ‘a deprivation of a constitutional right is significantly different from an”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 88 Cal. App. 3d 706 - Rossiter v. Benoit