507 So. 2d 554 - Hill v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 16 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 18 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “" State v. Thompson , 695 S.W.2d 154 [, 157-58] (Mo.App. 1985) (quoting State v. Correra , 430 A.2d 1251 , 1253 (R.I. 1981)). Alabama has expressly rejected the diminished capacity doctrine. Neelley v. State , 494 So.2d 669 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985). "The rule applied in this jurisdiction is sometimes referred to as the `all-or-nothing' approach. Comment, Diminished Capacity — Recent Decisions and an Analytical Approach , 30 Vand.L.Rev. 213 (1977). That is, under our statutes a defendant is either sane or he is not. Thus, a charge on a lesser included offense predicated on mental capacity should not be given when the evidence suggests that the defendant has a diminished mental capacity, but is not insane as defined in § 13A-3-1 , Code of Alabama 1975. "If the jury in the present case had found that appellant Hill was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time she shot the decedent and that that disease or defect produced the act, then she could be found not guilty by reason of mental defect. In that event, a charge on the lesser included offense would not be needed. If, on the other hand, she was found to be sane at the time of the murder, a lesser included offense charge . . . should be given only if the facts of the particular case — facts unrelated to any diminished mental capacity — would warrant the giving of such a charge."”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Dunaway v. State · Slaton v. State

2. “The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction of intentional murder, holding that the evidence of the battered spouse syndrome had been properly excluded. Judge Bowen concurred in the result reached by the majority. However, he dissented from that portion of the opinion implying that expert opinion testimony on the battered wife syndrome is per se inadmissible. Rather, he felt that”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 515 So. 2d 121 - Handley v. State · 612 So. 2d 1352 - Hoosier v. State

3. “"Under the Frye standard, expert testimony concerning a scientific or medical principle will be admissible only when the proponent of the evidence establishes that the principle has achieved general acceptance in the scientific field to which it belongs. Adams v. State , 484 So.2d 1143 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985); Prewitt v. State , 460 So.2d 296 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Dyas v. United States , 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.C.A. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 , 98 S.Ct. 529 , 54 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977); McCormick on Evidence, § 13 p. 31 (2d ed. 1972)."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 612 So. 2d 1352 - Hoosier v. State · 879 So. 2d 1169 - Cjl v. Mwb