Horn v. Quarterman’s Empirical Analysis
508 F.3d 306 · 2007
Citation profile
5 federal appellate · 16 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently July 2022 · most notably Bush v. State (2008), State v. Johnson (2011)
5 federal appellate · 16 state decisions — followed in 13 states
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) · 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996)
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Chapman v. State of California · Crawford v. Washington · Kotteakos v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Craig’s references to “an important public policy” and “an important state interest,” are reasonably read to suggest a general rule not limited to protecting child victims of sexual abuse offenses from the trauma of testifying in a defendant’s presence. Rather, it is possible to Anew Craig as allowing a necessity-based exception for face-to-face, in-courtroom confrontation where the witness’s inability to testify invokes the state’s interest in protecting the Avitness — from trauma in child sexual abuse cases or, as here, from physical danger or suffering.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““A state court’s decision constitutes an ‘unreasonable application’ of ‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,’ ‘ “if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case.” ’ Busby [v. Dretke], 359 F.3d [708,] 713 [5th Cir.2004] (quoting Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 , 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843 , 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002)). “We cannot reverse the denial of habeas relief simply by concluding that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously,’ but rather, ‘we must conclude that such application was also unreasonable.’ Martin [v. Cain], 246 F.3d [471] 476 [5th Cir.2001]; see Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230 , 233 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) (per curiam) (denying habeas relief where state court’s conclusion was incorrect but not unreasonable).” (footnote omitted)”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority““(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.””
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.