Jackson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Defendant argues that the words ‘may be explained’ and ‘if unsatisfactorily explained’ in essence shift the burden of proof to the defendant and compel him to make an explanation contrary to his right to remain silent. It is true that a statutory presumption that a person in possession of stolen property knew it to be stolen, is arbitrary, creates an unconstitutional presumption, and denies the defendant of due process when a jury is so instructed. Payne v. State, Okl.Cr., 435 P.2d 424 (1967). However, the instruction in the instant case does not create such an unconstitutional presumption. The instruction in the instant case is identical to the one held to be valid by this Court in Miller v. State, Okl.Cr., 481 P.2d 175,178 (1970). This instruction does not advise the jury that the defendant must explain his possession, rather it advises the jury that the possession may be explained, and if unsatisfactorily explained, such possession may be considered in determining guilt. The use of the word ‘may’ is significant. The defendant is not compelled to explain away his possession either by his own testimony or other evidence, and the jury need not consider his possession in determining guilt or innocence. We therefore conclude that the instruction challenged did not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof from [sic] the defendant.” Jackson v. State, Okl.Cr., 508 P.2d 277 (1973). [Emphasis original]”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Bridgman v. State · Webb v. State

2. ““ ‘The possession of recently stolen property found in the possession of one alleged to have concealed it, knowing at that time or having reasonable cause to believe that it was stolen property, may be explained, but such possession is a circumstance, which, if unsatisfactorily explained to the jury, may be considered in determining the guilt or innocence of the person charged with concealing stolen property. The mere possession of property recently stolen is not alone sufficient to convict the possessor of knowingly concealing stolen property, or having reasonable cause to believe that it was stolen property, but when such fact is supplemented with other facts inconsistent with the idea that the possession is honest, it then becomes a question of fact for the jury to pass upon as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, of knowingly concealing stolen property.’ ” (Emphasis by the Court)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hughes v. State

3. “. . The mere possession of property recently stolen is not alone sufficient to convict the possessor of knowingly concealing stolen property, or having reasonable cause to believe that it was stolen property, but when such fact is supplemented with other facts inconsistent with the idea that possession is honest, it then becomes a question of fact for the jury to pass upon as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, of knowingly concealing stolen property.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Richardson v. State