Commonwealth v. Wright’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

220 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 226 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(a) Mandatory sentence.—Any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaughter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(f), (ii) or (iii) (relating to robbery), aggravated assault as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) (relating to aggravated assault) or kidnapping, or who is convicted of attempt to commit any of these crimes, shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. (b) Proof of sentencing.—Provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth’s intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider any evidence presented at trial and shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present any necessary additional evidence and shall determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, if this section is applicable. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712(a) & (b), Historical and Statutory Notes. Section 9712(a) has since been amended, adding additional conditions related to the use of a firearm during the”

   17 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 346 Pa. Super. 599 - Commonwealth v. Taylor · Commonwealth v. Dickson

2. “straightforward issue susceptible of objective proof”

   11 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Wooten · 346 Pa. Super. 599 - Commonwealth v. Taylor

3. “[I]t is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Even though the defendant has no substantive right to a particular sentence within the range authorized by statute, the sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding at which he is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 [ 88 S.Ct. 254 , 19 L.Ed.2d 336 ] (1967); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 [ 87 S.Ct. 1209 , 18 L.Ed.2d 326 ] (1967). The defendant has a legitimate interest in the character of the procedure which leads to the imposition of sentence even if he may have no right to object to a particular result of the sentencing process. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521-523 [ 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 ] (1968); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 [ 97 S.Ct. 1197 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 ] (1977) (footnote omitted). Although sentencing proceedings must comport with due process, the convicted defendant need not be accorded the "entire panoply of criminal trial procedural rights." Id. at 358 n. 9. As the United States Supreme Court has explained: Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due. It has been said so often by this Court and others as not to require citation to authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.... Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been deter”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Halye · Commonwealth v. Koller