Amadio v. Levin’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 district · 96 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 110 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “This summary of the pertinent decisions reveals that we are in uncharted seas. We have no expressions of legislative intent on which to rely, nor do we have guidance from the Supreme Court. Given the nature of the issue before us, we conclude that it is up to the legislature to create the cause of action. In the absence of any expression of intent for the legislature or any analysis by our Supreme Court, we cannot decide that fetuses born prior to attaining viability should now be accorded the same rights that children who have attained viability have been accorded under the Wrongful Death and Survival Acts. As Chief Justice Nix wrote in his dissent to Amadio : It is a cardinal principle that fundamental public policy should be ascertained and articulated through legislative fiat and not through judicial edict. For illustration, the majority appears to assign this “new cause of action” based upon the viability of the fetus. This option in favor of viability as opposed to conception touches upon one of the most controversial questions of our day. Clearly, disputes of this nature cannot satisfactorily be resolved by court decisions.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 431 Pa. Super. 152 - Ladov v. Skrentner

2. “The second major objection to permitting wrongful death and survival actions on behalf of a stillborn child is the “derivative” nature of such actions. According to this reasoning, neither Act “was intended to provide a recovery in cases where the person on whose behalf the suits were brought was never alive,” and “[f]or purposes of monetary recovery, a stillborn child was never alive.” Dissenting Opinion of Flaherty, J. at 2. See also Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. at 490, 431 A.2d at 961; Carroll v. Skloff, 415 Pa. at 48, 202 A.2d at 10-11. This reasoning succumbs to the fallacy of petitio principii, commonly identified as circular reasoning or begging the question. Thus a fetus is not considered to have certain legal rights because it has not been born. No reason in logic is given why these rights could not be ascribed to a child before birth, only that they are not. When the question presented is whether or not legal rights should be ascribed, that question cannot be answered simply by stating that the law does not do so.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Hudak v. Georgy

3. “The alternative of drawing an arbitrary line anywhere is to recognize the cause of action generally while, of course, maintaining the not-insubstantial burden of proving causation in each case. Modern medical science has advanced to such a state that many of the heretofore existent causation gaps can now be closed. That such gaps might remain open in some cases should preclude recovery in those cases for failure to meet the burden of proof of causation, but should not invalidate those causes of action for which expert medical testimony can bridge the gap. Thus, rather than drawing a line at the birth of a child, viability or some arbitrary period of gestation, I would simply allow the action to proceed to trial and let the orderly production of evidence by the adversaries draw its own line.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 391 Pa. Super. 409 - Coveleski v. Bubnis