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51 Ala. 525

Moore v. Faggard

Supreme Court of Alabama

Decided June 15, 1874

Supreme Court of Alabama · decided 1874-06-15

Heard before the Hon. A. W. Dillabd. The bill in this case was filed, on the 4th July, 1873, by Mark D. L. Moore, against R. D. Faggard, Wiley Reed, and Henry Lavender, and sought to enjoin a judgment, which the said defendants, suing as partners under the firm name of R. D. Faggard & Co., had recovered against the said Moore, in the circuit court of said county, on the 3d April, 1873.

Relies on McCollum v. Prewitt · Pierce & Baldwin v. Pass & Co.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1874-06-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently September 1928

3 state decisions

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Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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B. F. SAFFOLD, J.

¶1The appellant, in his bill, alleged that the appellees, suing as a partnership under the firm name of R. D. Faggard & Co., had recovered a judgment by default against him for work and labor done in building a house. He claimed that they were not partners, but joint creditors of himself, and that they separately owed him accounts nearly or quite equal to the amount recovered by them, and were insolvent. The chancellor, on demurrer for want of equity, dismissed the bill, because he showed no reason why he had not applied for relief before the rendition of the judgment, which now estopped him from denying the partnership of the defendants.

¶2It is not at all improbable that the complainant might have had a case for equitable relief, if he had applied for it before the judgment at law. A joint debt may in equity be set off against a separate debt, where there is a clear series of transactions, establishing that there was a joint credit given on account of the separate debt. 2 Story’s Eq. Jur. § 1437. But the individual debt of a member of a partnership is not a set-off to a debt due the partnership. Pierce & Baldwin v. Pass & Co., 1 Port. 232. It is possible it might be in equity, if it were shown that the partnership was not insolvent, and that the individual member was. But no such state of facts is alleged in the present bill.

¶3Where a party, after judgment at law, seeks its injunction, on grounds known to him before, he must repel negligence, or want of diligence on his part. He ought not to let the suit at law proceed to judgment, when he knows he has an equitable *527defence against it. He is especially not entitled to relief after judgment, when that judgment, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, establishes facts preclusive of his right to relief. Such judgment is as conclusive as any other, and can only be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, or the act of the opposite party. Brickell’s Dig. p. 666, § 376; Isbell v. Morris, Bell, & Co., 1 Stew. & Port 41; McCollum v. Prewitt, 37 Ala. 573. The complainant assigns no reason whatever why he suffered the judgment to go against him.

Note by Reporter.— The appellant’s counsel having filed an application for a rehearing, the following opinion was delivered in response to it.

¶4The decree is affirmed.

B. F. SAFFOLD, J.

¶5The legal defence, which the appellant lost by neglecting to defend the suit at law, is the non-partnership. The partnership of the plaintiffs in that suit is now established against him, by the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, and he has nothing to say why he suffered it to be done. The allegation of the bill, that the plaintiffs in the action at law were each equally interested, and entitled to receive one third of the price of doing the complainant’s work, is not equivalent to an averment that the partnership owed no debts of any description to anybody.

¶6A rehearing is denied.

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