Volume 51 — Connecticut Reports

Complaint by a prosecuting agent for a violation of tlie statute against selling intoxicating liquors; brought, by appeal of the defendant from the judgment of a justice, to the Superior Court in Middlesex County, and in that court tried to the jury before Stoddard, J. Verdict guilty, and motion in arrest of judgment on the ground of the insufficiency of the complaint. Motion overruled and appeal to this court by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

<p>The plaintiff and defendants were severally the grantees of parties'who, in 1866, were the owners of sundry mills and mill sites upon a stream and had for thirty years owned a dam and the right of flowage by it, constituting a reservoir for their common use. In that year the grantors of the defendants, who were riparian owners next below the dam, built a new dam on their own land a little below'the old one, and three feet higher, having obtained the right of flowage by it by proceedings under the flowage act. To these proceedings the other parties interested in the old reservoir were not made parties, but they all acquiesced in the | building of the new dam, and the submerging by it of the old dam,believing that it would be a substitute for the old dam and of greater-benefit to all parties interested; and the new reservoir was thereafter’ used by all the mill-owners who had before used the old one. Eight’ hi years after the erection of the new dam one of the owners of the old; <. one conveyed all his interest in the old dam and in the right to flow by. it, to the plaintiff. Held that the rights of the owners of the old dam ’ and reservoir were not to be regarded as abandoned by their acquies- , cence in the erection of the new dam, but that they still existed, and' . . that the. conveyance to the plain tiff vested in him whatever rights'hi?. grantor had in the old dam and reservoir, and that these carried with them an interest in the new reservoir so long as the new dam was' used to create such a reservoir.</p> <p>And held that the interest thus acquired in the new reservoir’ was one which a court of equity would protect against a wilful destruction of. the new dam by the defendants. If the defendants did not wish to ■' " detain the water they were bound to allow other parties intérésted to • -1 do so. At the same time they were not bound to maintain it at their' own expense for the benefit of the plaintiff; It was a matter for equitable regulation.</p> <p>The parties who constructed the new dam and reservoir made a mortgage it-of “ all their right, title and interest” in it, the deed containing eovem nants of seisin and warranty, but not otherwise describing the pro-• , ■- perty conveyed or defining the right. The mortgagors subsequently ,. acquired the right to flow- certain lands which were in fact flowed at ‘ the time but without the right of flowage perfected. Held that this-'right did not when acquired enure to the benefit of the mortgagee. -,</p> <p>The rule that a tenant in common can not convey a several interest in the, property has no application to rights held in common .to the use, of water.</p>

Action for the breach of a covenant against incumbrances ; brought to the District Court of Litchfield County, and tried to the court before Warner, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for a part of his claim. Appeals by both parties. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action on a policy of fire insurance; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County. Complaint demurred to, and held by the court (Andrews, J.,') insufficient, and judgment rendered for the defendants. Appeal by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion. cited Hay v. Star Ins. Co., 77 N. York, 242; Steen v. Niagara Ins. Co., 89 id., 320; Chandler v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 21 Minn., 88; Westchester Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 44 Mich., 423; Killips v. Putnam Ins.

Civil action to recover of tbe defendant, as administrator witb the will annexed of one Priscilla B. Leach, certain moneys of which she had the possession and life use; brought to the Superior Court in Middlesex County. The plaintiff was administrator of Beriah N. Leach, her husband, who owned the moneys subject to her life use. The court (,Stoddard, Jl), sustained a plea in abatement and rendered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

Bill in equity to compel the defendant town to guarantee certain railroad bonds; brought to the Superior Court iii Middlesex County. Facts found by a committee and case reserved for advice. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court. 1. The warning of the town meeting of September 30th, 1871, was sufficient. 1 Swift Dig., 228; Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn., 28; Weeks v. Hull, 19 id., 380; Manning v. Dove, 10 Rich. (So. Car.), 395. 2.

Suit for a foreclosure; brought to the District Court of the county of Litchfield. Facts found and case reserved for advice. The ease is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Actioh on a promissory note held by the plaintiff as endorsee; brought to the City Court of the city of Hartford and tried to the court before Bennett, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated iu the opinion.

Action to recover the possession of land; brought to the Superior Court. The following facts were found by the court:— Nathan Comstock, grandfather of the plaintiff, died in 1884, seized of a farm in the town of Montville, upon which he had resided, containing about seventy-five acres. The demanded premises are a part of that farm.

Suit for a foreclosure; brought to the Superior Court. The defendants demurred to the complaint; the court (Andrews, J.,~) overruled the demurrer and passed a decree of foreclosure. The defendants appealed to this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for the obstruction of a right of way; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of ISTew London County, and tried to the court on a general denial before Mather, J. The following facts were found by- the court:— On the 23d of July, 1835, Ralph Hurlbut, Lydia Wyyongs, Parthenia Hoscott and Cynthia Hoscott, in compliance with and in conformity to a resolution of the General Assembly, passed at its May session, 1835, conveyed by warranty deed to Joshua E. Woodworth, the…

Bill in Equity to set aside certain deeds; brought to the Superior Court. Facts found and petition dismissed by the court (Park, G. J.) Motion in error by the petitioner. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Actios to recover damages for the removal of brush with oysters growing upon it, from Pequonock River, in the town of Groton; brought to the… Held: examinations were made by its members .and committees of the board, of the river, of the brush and oysters,.and of an offensive pig-stye; also of some heaps of river inud and sea weed which had been collected and deposited upon or near the shore of the river; also of some swamps or marshes, all which were near to the locality…

Action for demurrage; brought, by appeal from a justice of the peace, to the Court of Common Pleas for New London County, and tried in that court to the jury, before Mather, J. Yerdict for the plaintiff; motion in arrest of judgment for the insufficiency of the complaint; motion overruled, and appeal by the defendants. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action brought by the plaintiff as trustee in insolvency of Jedediah Spalding, to recover money of the estate claimed to have been received by the defendants, who set up in defence an equitable lien upon it. The case was brought to the Court of Common Pleas and tried to the jury before Mather, J. Verdict for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants. The court made a finding of the facts, which are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Appeal to the Superior Court from the doings of commissioners on an insolvent estate in making a valuation of security held by the appellant upon a claim presented by him against the estate. The appellee demurred to the reasons assigned for appeal and the court (Hovey, J.,) sustained the demurrer and dismissed the appeal. The appellants appealed to this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Lra'OKMATiou in the nature of a writ of quo warranto, filed by the State’s Attorney at the relation of Frank S. Andrew, in the Superior Court in New Haven County, averring the election of the relator to the office of mayor of the city of New Haven, and the usurpation and exercisé of the office by the defendant, and praying that process might be issued requiring the defendant to show by what warrant he held the office.

Action for an account and a specific performance of a partnership agreement; brought to the Superior Court. Account taken by a committee; remonstrance by the plaintiff against the acceptance of the report; report accepted and judgment rendered for the defendant, (Sanford, J.~) Appeal by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Suit to set aside certain conveyances of real estate and for the vesting of the title in the plaintiff; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of New Haven County, and tried before Torrance, J. Facts found and judgment for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>The Ousatonic Water Company was chartered with power to construct a dam across the Ousatonic River, the charter containing the following provision: — “In the construction and maintenance of their dam it shall be their duty, with the approval of the selectmen of the town, to alter the bed or course of any highway where necessary, and they shall have power to enter upon and use all lands that shall be necessary in making such alterations.” Held that the charter made it the duty of the company to make such alterations of highways where necessary, and that it was not left to their discretion.</p> <p>Their dam set back the water in such a way that in spring freshets a highway along the river was exposed to obstructions from ice that came down the river and accumulated at the head of the pond. Held that so far as this was an ordinary effect of spring freshets, the company was bound to protect the road from it by some effective means; but that it would be otherwise if it was only the effect of an extraordinary flood or caused by unusual circumstances not to have been expected.</p> <p>Where their duty was clear mandamus at the suit of the state held to be the proper remedy.</p> <p>But since the company had the right to use its own judgment as to the mode of remedying the evil, a mandamus was held to be an improper one that ordered them to do it by altering the course or bed of the road. The court had no right to prescribe the particular manner in which it should be done.</p>

Action to recover for an injury received by the plaintiff while travelling in the cars of the defendants, a railroad company; brought to the Superior Court. The case was heard in damages after demurrer overruled by Andrews, J., and the following facts found.

Suit for an account and for damages; brought to the Superior Court. The defendants were executors of Samuel Hamilton. Facts found by a committee, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff, (Andrews, J.) Appeal by the defendants. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

The Superior Court (Andrews, *71,) affirmed the decree, and the appellant appealed to this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action for trespass to land; brought to the District Court of the district of Waterbury. Plea to the jurisdiction ; demurrer to the plea sustained, and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs. Appeal bjr defendants to the Superior Court and judgment affirmed (Culver, J.) Appeal by defendant to this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action against the defendants, principal and sureties on a bond for the faithful discharge by the defendant Lawlor of his duties as collector of taxes for the plaintiff city; brought to .the City Court of the city of Waterbury. The declaration alleged a breach of the bond in the failure to pay over to the city moneys collected by Lawlor as taxes.

Replevin for a piano; brought to the court of common pleas, and tried to the court before Torrance, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants for one dollar damages and costs. The defendants claimed also a judgment for the return of the piano, which had been delivered to the plaintiff under the process of replevin.

Suit for the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien; brought to the Superior Court. The facts were found by a committee, and judgment rendered for. the plaintiff. (Sanford, J.~) Appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Application under the act of 1879 to Judge Sanford of the Superior Court for the appointment of a surveyor to designate the line between adjoining owners of oyster grounds on Long Island Sound. Surveyor appointed; report made; remonstrance by defendants against its acceptance; facts found on remonstrance and report approved;, appeal by the defendants. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>A will gave the executor “full power, according to the best of his judgment, to sell any of the estate, real or personal, at such times, on such terms, and in such manner as he shall deem expedient, and to re-invest the proceeds or apply them to the payment of debts.” Held that the power conferred on the executor was a naked power to sell, without an interest.</p> <p>And the power being a mere naked one to sell, the executor had no power, in selling one piece of land to grant a right to carry a 'drain through other land of the estate.</p>

Civil Actioh for the conversion of two carriages ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas, and tried to the jury before Torrance, J. Verdict for the plaintiff and appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover damages for the breach of a covenant against incumbrances; brought to the Court of Common Pleas. Facts found and case reserved for advice. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Assumpsit against the defendants as administrators of the estate of Elisha Wheeler, deceased; brought to the Superior Court. Facts found by a committee, and case reserved, on a demurrer to a remonstrance against the acceptance of the committee’s report, for the advice of this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Shit for a foreclosure and for other equitable relief; brought to the Superior Court. Facts found and case reserved for advice. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action upon a policy of fire insurance on a stock of merchandise; brought to the Superior Court. Held: with the exception of a few small auction house notes, by the Merchants’ National Bank of this city; in other words, nearly $3 firm assets to $1 of liabilities. Last year’s cash sales, nearly $600,000; profits nearly $40,000.

Action to set aside certain tax liens and to recover taxes claimed to have been illegally assessed and collected, and for an injunction; brought to the Superior Court. Facts found and case reserved for advice. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Trespass for entering upon grounds in the possession of the plaintiff as an oyster bed and taking and carrying away oysters; brought, by appeal from a justice of the peace, to the Court of Compon Pleas of New Haven county, and in that court tried to the jury before Torrance, J. Verdict for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>The plaintiff in 1851 purchased of the owner of land through which ran a brook, the right to build and maintain upon the land a dam and divert to his own land, not riparian, as much water as would run through a three-inch pipe. He built the dam and from it laid a two-inch pipe to his house, and later to the houses of other persons who paid him for the water, and soon after obtained from all the lower proprietors on the brook a perpetual release from all claim for damages for the diversion. In 1881 the defendant purchased an acre of land higher up on the stream, and began and had since continued to divert as much water as could pass through a two-inch pipe to his farm, about half a mile distant, no part of which was riparian, and there to use it at his house and barn, for a fountain, and for watering his lawn and the street, returning none to the brook. The brook was always much reduced in quantity in the summer, and in times of severe drouth would all pass through an orifice one inch and a half in diameter. In a suit for an injunction against a diversion of the water by the defendant in such a way as to prevent the plaintiff’s getting a supply for his own pipe, it was held—</p> <p>1. That while the defendant, as an upper riparian owner, had a right which took precedence of all rights below, to consume water for drinking, culinary and other domestic uses, and for the watering of animals, yet this right was confined to riparian land.</p> <p>2. That the plaijitiff, whatever might be the effect of the conveyance of the right to him by a riparian owner, yet having under it diverted and used the water for more than fifteen years, had acquired the right to have the stream come to him in its accustomed flow for such use, which right the defendant was so far bound to respect that he could not, as an upper riparian owner, subsequently commence uses of the water, injurious to the right, on land not riparian.</p> <p>Whether the plaintiff would not have had a right, which was entitled to judicial recognition and protection, before the end of the fifteen years: Qucere.</p> <p>AVhere the plaintiff, having such water rights, sold the dwelling house which he had occupied with a right to a portion of'the water, retaining his right to the remainder, it was held that he had a property in what remained and a standing in court by reason of it.</p> <p>The defendant, intending to divert the water in the manner stated, notified the plaintiff of his intention and requested him to institute legal proceedings by way of prevention before expense was incurred. The plaintiff did not do so, but the defendant had full knowledge that the plaintiff disputed his right to divert the water in the way he proposed. Held that the plaintiff had not waived his rights by neglecting to take legal proceedings at the time.</p> <p>Assignees in bankruptcy and trustees in insolvency hold the estates of the debtors upon a trust, first, to apply so much as is necessary to the payment of proven debts and attendant expenses, and secondly, to return whatever surplus may remain to the original owner. Where such a surplus is thus left upon a mere naked trust to reconvey, a court of equity will protect the rights of the equitable owner in it from threatened injury upon his application.</p> <p>A conveyance of “ a certain piece of land with the buildings thereon, and appurtenances,” but making no mention of any water rights, does not carry with it the right of the owner to bring water from a stream on other lands by a pipe terminating at the house.</p>

<p>The defendant H as principal and the other defendants as his sureties gave the plaintiffs, a life insurance company, a bond for $5,000, conditioned that H, who had been appointed general agent for the company to procure applications for insurance and collect premiums on policies issued thereon, should make monthly payments to the company of all moneys which he might receive for or owe them and should faithfully discharge . his duties as such agent. H entered upon the agency and for six years made monthly reports and settlements, until, upon making his report for a certain month, he was unable to pay the amount called for by the report. ' The plaintiffs insisted on payment, and on his neglect to pay, discharged him from his agency. In a suit brought by them on the bond it was held—</p> <p>1. That H had no such vested interest in the premiums thereafter to be collected on policies issued through his agency as could not be affected by his justifiable removal from office.</p> <p>2. That a provision in his contract with the plaintiffs that he might dispose of his agency to a person acceptable to the plaintiffs and subject to the same dirties and privileges, and that if he should die while in office the plaintiffs would make some arrangement whereby his heirs might have the equitable value of the agency, did not secure his right to the future premiums as against all other modes of terminating his agency.</p> <p>3. That the plaintiffs had a right to remove him from his agency on account of his defalcation, and that such a removal terminated his interest in such premiums.</p> <p>A That H was liable for that portion of the deficit which was caused by the failure of his sub-agents to pay over to him moneys that they had received.</p> <p>5. That the sureties were also liable for such moneys in the hands of his sub-agents, the business secured by the bond being that of a general insurance agent, which ordinarily involves sub-agencies.</p> <p>Where there has been no misrepresentation or concealment on the part of the obligee in such a bond as to any fact that it was important to the sureties to know, it is no defense that they were ignorant of the extent of the obligation assumed. It was their duty to inquire before assuming the obligation.</p> <p>The mere failure of the obligee in such a bond to notify the sureties of the default of the principal will not discharge them.</p> <p>The plaintiffs, at the time the bond was given, held H’s note for $25,000. Several months after, without the knowledge of the sureties, they took from him a mortgage to secure this note and gave him an agreement that they would not enforce the mortgage, but would collect it out of the insurance business in his hands, on which they were to have a lien. Held not to discharge the sureties.</p>

<p>The statute (Gen. Statutes, p. 199, sec. 5,) provides, with regard to the right of one town to recover of another for the support of a pauper of the latter by the former, that the selectmen of the claimant town shall give notice to those of the other of the condition of the pauper, “stating his name.” Held that a notice describing the paupers as “Austin Seymour (colored) and wife, and four children aged from ten years down to an infant,” was sufficient not only for the parents but for the children.</p> <p>There is nothing technical in the statute. It means that definite information as to the pauper shall be given, and that is all that is intended by its language.</p> <p>Mere commorancy does not give a settlement to a person not already an inhabitant of the state.</p> <p>An illegitimate child takes the settlement of its mother if she has one in this state.</p> <p>The place of a person’s birth is prima facie the place of his settlement.</p> <p>A wife takes the settlement of her husband, if he has any; if he has none she retains her own.</p> <p>Proof that a woman had married is not sufficient to create a presumption of a change of her settlement; it must also be shown that the husband had a settlement.</p>

Suit for an injunction; brought to the Court of Common Pleas in Hartford County, and heard before Dennett, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Suit for a foreclosure; brought to the Superior Court in Litchfield County. Plea in abatement overruled; facts found and judgment for the plaintiff. Appeal by the defendant. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Suit for a foreclosure of mortgaged premises; brought to the City Court of the city of Hartford and heard before Bennett, J. The following facts were found by the court.

- Action for an injury to the plaintiff’s person and property by being run into by the defendant’s horse and wagon; brought to the Superior Court, and tried to the jury, on a general denial, before Stoddard, J. On the trial the plaintiff offered evidence to prove that on December 5th, 1881, he was driving his horse, attached to a carriage, upon the highway described in the complaint; that he was driving upon the right hand side of the road, which at that point was broad and…

Suit for the determination of the validity and legal effect of certain provisions of the will of Seth .Smith; brdught to the Superior Court in New London Count}'. The plaintiff was administrator with the will annexed, and all the parties interested were made defendants. The will, after giving to Mary Comstock, the niece of the testator, one thousand dollars, which legacy was afterwards revoked by a codicil, proceeded as follows:— “ Second.

Application to open a judgment rendered by default in the Superior Court; heard before Hovey, J. The following facts were found by the court. The judgment which- the petitioner , asked the court to set aside, was rendered in an action of general indebitatus assumpsit for work done and money paid, laid out and expended by the respondents, who were plaintiffs in the action, in making repairs on a steam dredge of which the petitioner was the owner.

Trespass ok the case for damage for wrongfully setting back the water of a stream ; brought to the Superior Court. A former judgment in the case for the plaintiff having been reversed by this court, (50 Conn. R., 346,) and the case remanded, the plaintiff moved to be allowed to amend his declaration by filing new counts, and also claimed a new trial upon the facts, although a finding of the facts had been made upon the former trial.

Action for damages for the killing of an ox of the plaintiff’s by a locomotive run by the defendant, a railroad company; brought to the court of Common Pleas, and tried before Hall, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. Appeal by the defendant. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action for an injury from falling upon ice on a sidewalk' of the defendant city; brought to the District Court of Waterbury, and tried to the court on a general denial, before Bradstreet, J. The court made the following finding of facts. The plaintiff was injured by slipping upon the ice upon the sidewalk on the east side of Bank street, in the city of Waterbury, soon after six o’clock in the evening of December 30th, 1880.

The defendant demurred to the application, and the case was reserved, upon the demurrer, for the advice of this court. The case is more fully stated in the opinion.

Action for breach of contract; brought to the Superior Court. Facts found by a committee and case reserved for ádviee. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action to recover money paid for taxes on mortgaged property; brought by appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace to the Court of Common Pleas. Demurrer to the complaint, and reservation for advice. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Actioh for an assault; brought to the District Court of Waterbury, and tried to the court before Bradsireet, J. Facts found, and judgment rendered for the plaintiff. Appeal by defendant to the Superior Court, which court' (Stoddard, J.) affirmed the decision. The defendant appealed from that judgment to this court. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

<p>A testator having no children and whose heirs at law were aliens, leaving real and personal estate, gave his widow “all the residue” of his estate after the payment of his debts, “ for her sole use and benefit as long as she lives.” Held to give her only a life estate.-</p> <p>It was not enough to change the construction of the will in this respect as to the real estate, that it had made no disposition of the fee.</p> <p>Nor as to the personal estate, that the corpus of it was not disposed of.</p> <p>The personal estate did not vest in her beneficially as executrix by reason of the next jjf kin being aliens.</p> <p>Aliens can take personal estate by distribution.</p> <p>A widow, under what she supposed to be good legal advice, and in ignorance of her rights, renounced the provision made for her by a will, under the statute (Gen. Statutes, p. 377, sec. 4,) allowing her to elect to take her dower instead, on giving notice within a time limited to the probate court; but afterwards, finding that she had been improperly advised, before any distribution of the estate had been made, but after the time for making her election had expired, applied to the probate court to be allowed to recall her former election' and to take under the will, which application the court denied. Held that the probate court had power to grant her application, and ought to have done so.</p>

Shit for the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien upon a building; brought to the Superior Court. Facts found by a committee and judgment for the plaintiff. (Beardsley, J.~) Appeal by the defendants. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for trespass to land ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas, and tried to the court before Torrance, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant. Appeal by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage; brought to the City Court of the city of New Haven.

Scike facias; brought to the District Court of Waterbury. The plaintiff had recovered a judgment in that court against one Mansfield for $292.50 damages and $37.84 costs of suit, under the statute (Gen. Statutes, tit. 16, ch. 7, secs. 20, 21, as amended by Acts of 1875, ch. 7,) which provides that “ when the drivers of any vehicles for the conveyance of persons shall meet each other on the public highway, each shall turn to the right and slacken liis pace so as to give half…

The complaint alleged that John Reynolds, a minor son of the plaintiff, of the age of eleven years, was confined without law or right in the State Reform School at Meriden by the defendant, and prayed that a writ of habeas corpus might be issued.

Action for goods sold; brought to the Court of Common Pleas, and tried to the court before Torrance, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for tlie defendant. Appeal by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Two suits, the first brought by the plaintiff, as trustee in insolvency of the Wetmore Machine Company, to compel the defendant, Grinnell, to release a mortgage which he claimed to hold upon the machinery of the company; the other, brought later, by Grinnell, to foreclose the same mortgage.

Facts found on the motion and the question reserved for the advice of this court. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Actioh to recover for supplies furnished to paupers claimed to belong to the defendant town; tried to the jury in the Superior Court before Stoddard, J. Verdict for the plaintiffs, and appeal by the defendants for error in the rulings and charge of the court. The case is'sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action on a recognizance ; brought to the Court of Common Pleas, and tried to the court before Torrance, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the defendant. Appeal by the plaintiff. The case is fully stated in the opinion.

Action to recover for wood sold ; brought to the Superior Court and tried to the court before Stoddard, J. The defendants were a joint stock corporation. Facts found aiid judgment rendered for the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action on a policy of fire insurance; brought to thé Superior Court in, Windham County, and tried to the jury before Stoddard, J. Verdict for the plaintiff, and appeal by the defendants for error in the rulings and charge of the court. The points decided will be sufficiently understood without a statement .of the facts. The same case was before this court at a former term, (50 Conn., 420,) and the facts are fully stated in the report then given.

Assumpsit for money paid out and expended at the request of the defendant, brought by appeal from a justice to the Superior Court in Litchfield County. The case was referred in that court to a committee, who found a balance of $2.90 due the plaintiff.

Action to recover a sum of money in the hands of the defendant as executor, claimed to belong to the plaintiff as administrator; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the court before Andrews, J. Facts found and judgment rendered for the deféndant. Appeal by the plaintiff. The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Action for an injury from the negligence of the defendants ; brought to the Superior Court in Hartford County, and tried to the jury before Andrews, J. Upon the trial the plaintiff introduced evidence to prove, and claimed that she had proved, that the defendants, the owners of the building in which she was employed as a factory operative, had neglected, to sufficiently fasten a door leading into a closet; and that in consequence of such neglect she had fallen into a vault…

Action on a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace; brought to the Court of Common Pleas of Hartford County and tried to the court before Calhoun, J. The court found the following facts: — ■ On the trial the plaintiff, to prove the existence of the judgment set forth in the first count of his complaint, offered in evidence a writ found among the papers of Martin Hollister, deceased, who on the 29th day of May, 1869, was a justice of the peace for the county of Hartford,…

<p>As between, the parties the court will hold an absolute deed to be a mortgage, where it appears, expressly” or by implication, that it was so intended; but only where it so appears.</p> <p>A mortgagor applied to the mortgagee for a further loan of $300 on premises already mortgaged for $300. The mortgagee refused to make the further loan, but agreed to purchase the premises for the $600. Upon this the mortgagor conveyed the premises to the mortgagee by an absolute deed, and the latter paid him the $300 and gave rrp the mortgage note of $300, and agreed that the grantor might re-purchase the property at any time within six months on paying $G00. Held not to be a mortgage, but a sale with an optional right in the grantor to re-purchase.</p>

<p>Slight deviations in a route prayed for in an application for the laying out of a highway, are not important, so long as the termini are substantially the same as those prayed for.</p> <p>And it does not affect the case that the application specifies a surveyed route from one terminus of the proposed road to the other.</p> <p>Where an application specifies a certain point on an existing highway as a terminus, the committee have power, in their discretion, to make the new road of increased width at the terminus, with two diverging tracks, so as to make it more convenient for the public to pass from one road to the other; and this although it may leave a small triangular piece of land between the diverging tracks which is not used.</p> <p>The receiving by the committee of special hospitality or other attentions from persons interested in favor of or against the laying out of a road, while the matter is on trial, is objectionable as tending to create dissatisfaction in the defeated party, even where no effect has been produced upon the minds of the committee.</p> <p>But where the court below found that there was no improper conduct on the part of the committee unless it was to be inferred as matter of law from the facts found, it was held that the receiving of certain attentions specified, if not actually improper, could not be so regarded purely as matter of law.</p> <p>A committee in a highway case specially appointed by the court for the qualifications of the persons composing it, and generally upon the agreement of the parties, is to be considered as more likely to be beyond the reach of petty influences than ordinary jurymen.</p> <p>After a committee had made its report, laying out a highway and assessing damages to A for a certain piece of land taken, B filed a remonstrance against the acceptance of the report, alleging that he was the owner of the land and should have had the damages awarded in his favor. No question on the point had been made before the committee on the hearing. Held that the court properly sent the report back to the same committee for them to hear the claim of B and determine whether he owned the land, and to correct their report as to the damages if he was found to be the owner.</p>

<p>A husband, having no debts and without fraud, made a valid conveyance to his wife, through an intermediate grantee, of the homestead on which they lived, and of a hdrse, wagon, and other personal property , upon it. The deed was at once delivered and recorded, but there was no delivery of the personal property aside from the transfer of the' real estate. Several months later the personal property was attached by a creditor of the husband upon a debt subsequently contracted, the horse however being one that had been taken in exchange for the first one. The husband had continued to use, and control the property as before the transfer. Held—</p> <p>Í. That the horse having never been the property of the husband, his possession of it could not be a retention of possession.</p> <p>2. That the deed was notice to all the world of the transfer of the real estate and of the wife’s possession of it.</p> <p>3. That her possession of-the real estate carried with it the possession of the personal property transferred.</p> <p>4. That the possession of the real estate by the wife was none the less her possession because she shared it with her husband. . ,</p> <p>5. That a fraudulent retention of possession was not to be inferred, from the fact that the husband continued to use and control the property as ■ before, the1 husband usually having the care and use of the wife’s ; property, and it being impossible for her to have exclusive possession without withdrawing the property from family use, which could not be required of her.</p> <p>While the relation of husband and wife gives special opportunities for fraudulent transfers of property, and therefore transactions between-them are open to. special suspicion, yet this is only,in .relation .to actual fraud. Where no actual fraud exists the relation rather operates in their favor upon any question of merely constructive fraud. The husband’s possession and use of the wife’s property may be only a family use and as necessary to her interests as to his, and may be entirely consistent with her possession.</p> <p>The husband made the conveyance of the real and personal estate whilp very ill, and his expectation of death was found to "be the moving cause. The deed however was absolute on its face, was delivered unconditionally1 and at once put on record,, and no distinction was made in the transaction between the real and personal estate. Held that the gift of the personal property was not to be considered as a donatio causa mortis, and that therefore the title of the wife was not affected by her husband’s recovery.</p>

<p>A testatrix made tbe following bequest: — “I give to M all my household effects, books and papers of value, and everything the house contains; the same to be taken by him without inventory or appraisal.” Held not to include a promissory note of $100, and a savings bank book with deposits of $2,500 represented by it, which belonged to the testatrix and were found among her papers in her dwelling house immediately after her death.</p>

<p>Application to the Superior Court in Hartford County for a determination as to what person or persons were entitled to a reward offered by the applicant for the detection of a burglar. The application was made under the statute (Gen. Statutes, p. 487, see. 1,) which provides for the appointment of commissioners upon such an application, who shall hear all claimants for the reward and report their determination to the court. The case came, upon the report of such a committee, before Hovey, J., at the September term, 1881. The case is fully stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>A defendant in a cause pending in this -state, who lives in another state and is here in necessary attendance upon the trial of his case, is privileged while so in attendance from the service of process .upon him by summons in a civil action.'</p>